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Header value returned from the HTTP parser is expected to be null-terminated or
have a spare byte after the value bytes. When an empty header value was passed
by client in a literal header representation, neither was true. This could
result in segfault. The fix is to assign a literal empty null-terminated
string in this case.
Thanks to Andrey Kolyshkin.
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Unfinalized chain could result in segfault. The problem was introduced in
ef83990f0e25.
Patch by Andrey Kolyshkin.
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Per the latest post draft-32 specification updates on the topic:
https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts/pull/4391
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Both clearflags and badflags are removed. It makes a little sense now
to keep them as intermediate storage.
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They no longer differ.
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This gets rid of magic numbers from quic protection and allows to push down
header construction specifics further to quic transport.
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It doesn't make sense to expose the header type in a public function.
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The largely duplicate type-specific functions ngx_quic_parse_initial_header(),
ngx_quic_parse_handshake_header(), and a missing one for 0-RTT, were merged.
The new order of functions listed in ngx_event_quic_transport.c reflects this.
|_ ngx_quic_parse_long_header - version-invariant long header fields
\_ ngx_quic_supported_version - a helper to decide we can go further
\_ ngx_quic_parse_long_header_v1 - QUICv1-specific long header fields
0-RTT packets previously appeared as Handshake are now logged as appropriate:
*1 quic packet rx long flags:db version:ff00001d
*1 quic packet rx early len:870
Logging SCID/DCID is no longer duplicated as were seen with Initial packets.
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No functional changes.
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As with the previous change, it became feasible with feec2cc762f6
that removes ngx_quic_connection_t from ngx_connection_s.
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It became feasible to reduce after feec2cc762f6 that
removes ngx_quic_connection_t from ngx_connection_s.
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Removed a useless mask from the value being shifted, since it is 1-byte wide.
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If trailers were missing and a chain carrying the last_buf flag had no data
in it, then last HTTP/1 chunk was broken. The problem was introduced while
implementing HTTP/3 response body generation.
The change fixes the issue and reduces diff to the mainline nginx.
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Previously, if quic_stateless_reset_token_key was empty or unspecified,
initial stateless reset token was not generated. However subsequent tokens
were generated with empty key, which resulted in error with certain SSL
libraries, for example OpenSSL.
Now a random 32-byte stateless reset token key is generated if none is
specified in the configuration. As a result, stateless reset tokens are now
generated for all server ids.
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A similar directive is already available in HTTP.
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Previously new dcid was generated in the same memory that was allocated for
qc->dcid when creating the QUIC connection. However this memory was also
referenced by initial_source_connection_id and retry_source_connection_id
transport parameters. As a result these parameters changed their values after
retry which broke the protocol.
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Now QUIC connection is accessed via the c->udp field.
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Also, connection migration within a single worker is implemented.
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Before introduction of request body filter in 42d9beeb22db, the only
possible return code from the ngx_http_request_body_filter() call
without actual buffers was NGX_HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, and
the code in ngx_http_read_client_request_body() hardcoded the only
possible error to simplify the code of initial call to set rb->rest.
This is no longer true after introduction of request body filters though,
as a request body filter might need to return other errors, such as 403.
Fix is to preserve the error code actually returned by the call
instead of assuming 500.
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Added logging before returning NGX_HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR if there
are busy buffers after a request body flush. This should never happen
with current code, though bugs can be introduced by 3rd party modules.
Make sure debugging will be easy enough.
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Particularly, c->curr_seqnum is renamed to c->client_seqnum and
ngx_quic_alloc_connection_id() is renamed to ngx_quic_alloc_client_id().
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Previously, a version based on NGX_QUIC_DRAFT_VERSION was always set.
Now it is taken from the negotiated QUIC version that may differ.
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Draft-29 and beyond are now treated as compatible versions.
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A negotiated version is decoupled from NGX_QUIC_VERSION and, if supported,
now stored in c->quic->version after packets processing. It is then used
to create long header packets. Otherwise, the list of supported versions
(which may be many now) is sent in the Version Negotiation packet.
All packets in the connection are expected to have the same version.
Incoming packets with mismatched version are now rejected.
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When doing lingering close, the socket was first shut down for writing,
so SSL shutdown initiated after lingering close was not able to send
the close_notify alerts (ticket #2056).
The fix is to call ngx_ssl_shutdown() before shutting down the socket.
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The code removed became dead after 98f03cd8d6cc (0.8.14),
circa when the request reference counting was introduced.
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A number of unsigned variables has a special value, usually -1 or some maximum,
which produces huge numeric value in logs and makes them hard to read.
In order to distinguish such values in log, they are casted to the signed type
and printed as literal '-1'.
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The client address validation didn't complete with a valid token,
which was broken after packet processing refactoring in d0d3fc0697a0.
An invalid or expired token was treated as a connection error.
Now we proceed as outlined in draft-ietf-quic-transport-32,
section 8.1.3 "Address Validation for Future Connections" below,
which is unlike validating the client address using Retry packets.
When a server receives an Initial packet with an address validation
token, it MUST attempt to validate the token, unless it has already
completed address validation. If the token is invalid then the
server SHOULD proceed as if the client did not have a validated
address, including potentially sending a Retry.
The connection is now closed in this case on internal errors only.
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All key handling functionality is moved into ngx_quic_protection.c.
Public structures from ngx_quic_protection.h are now private and new
methods are available to manipulate keys.
A negotiated cipher is cached in QUIC connection from the set secret callback
to avoid calling SSL_get_current_cipher() on each encrypt/decrypt operation.
This also reduces the number of unwanted c->ssl->connection occurrences.
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No functional changes.
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No functional changes.
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When a packet is declared lost, its frames are handled differently according to
13.3. Retransmission of Information.
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Acknowledgments are regenerated using the most recent data available.
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Now "s", "V", and "v" format specifiers may be prefixed with "x" (lowercase)
or "X" (uppercase) to output corresponding data in hexadecimal format.
In collaboration with Maxim Dounin.
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Previously ACK ranges were logged as a gap/range sequence. Now these
values are expanded to packet number ranges for easier reading.
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Previously, tx ACK frames held ranges in an array of ngx_quic_ack_range_t,
while rx ACK frames held ranges in the serialized format. Now serialized format
is used for both types of frames.
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The patch resets ctx->frames queue, which may contain frames. It was possible
that congestion or amplification limits prevented all frames to be sent.
Retransmitted frames could be accounted twice as inflight: first time in
ngx_quic_congestion_lost() called from ngx_quic_resend_frames(), and later
from ngx_quic_discard_ctx().
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This allows to continue processing when the anti-amplification limit was hit.
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This accounts for the following change:
* Require expansion of datagrams to ensure that a path supports at
least 1200 bytes:
- During the handshake ack-eliciting Initial packets from the
server need to be expanded
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