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Previously, invalid connection preface errors were only logged at debug
level, providing no visible feedback, in particular, when a plain text
HTTP/2 listening socket is erroneously used for HTTP/1.x connections.
Now these are explicitly logged at the info level, much like other
client-related errors.
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When enabled, certificate status is stored in cache and is used to validate
the certificate in future requests.
New directive ssl_ocsp_cache is added to configure the cache.
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OCSP validation for client certificates is enabled by the "ssl_ocsp" directive.
OCSP responder can be optionally specified by "ssl_ocsp_responder".
When session is reused, peer chain is not available for validation.
If the verified chain contains certificates from the peer chain not available
at the server, validation will fail.
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Previously only the first responder address was used per each stapling update.
Now, in case of a network or parsing error, next address is used.
This also fixes the issue with unsupported responder address families
(ticket #1330).
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They should always be allocated from the main QUIC connection pool.
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Preserving pointers within the client buffer is not needed for HTTP/3 because
all data is either allocated from pool or static. Unlike with HTTP/1, data
typically cannot be referenced directly within the client buffer. Trying to
preserve NULLs or external pointers lead to broken pointers.
Also, reverted changes in ngx_http_alloc_large_header_buffer() not relevant
for HTTP/3 to minimize diff to mainstream.
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New field r->parse_start is introduced to substitute r->request_start and
r->header_name_start for request length accounting. These fields only work for
this purpose in HTTP/1 because HTTP/1 request line and header line start with
these values.
Also, error logging is now fixed to output the right part of the request.
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As per HTTP/3 draft 27, a request or response containing uppercase header
field names MUST be treated as malformed. Also, existing rules applied
when parsing HTTP/1 header names are also applied to HTTP/3 header names:
- null character is not allowed
- underscore character may or may not be treated as invalid depending on the
value of "underscores_in_headers"
- all non-alphanumeric characters with the exception of '-' are treated as
invalid
Also, the r->locase_header field is now filled while parsing an HTTP/3
header.
Error logging for invalid headers is fixed as well.
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The first one parses pseudo-headers and is analagous to the request line
parser in HTTP/1. The second one parses regular headers and is analogous to
the header parser in HTTP/1.
Additionally, error handling of client passing malformed uri is now fixed.
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The function ngx_http_parse_chunked() is also called from the proxy module to
parse the upstream response. It should always parse HTTP/1 body in this case.
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Currently there are no such streams, but the function
ngx_http_v3_get_uni_stream() supports them.
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Rephrased error message and removed trailing space. Long comments were
shortened/rephrased.
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According to quic-transport draft 28 section 10.3.1:
When sending CONNECTION_CLOSE, the goal is to ensure that the peer
will process the frame. Generally, this means sending the frame in a
packet with the highest level of packet protection to avoid the
packet being discarded. After the handshake is confirmed (see
Section 4.1.2 of [QUIC-TLS]), an endpoint MUST send any
CONNECTION_CLOSE frames in a 1-RTT packet. However, prior to
confirming the handshake, it is possible that more advanced packet
protection keys are not available to the peer, so another
CONNECTION_CLOSE frame MAY be sent in a packet that uses a lower
packet protection level.
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Now it is possible to specify frame type that caused an error
and a human-readable reason phrase.
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Frames in sent queues are discarded, as no acknowledgment is expected
if the connection is closing.
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There is no need in a separate type for the QUIC connection state.
The only state not found in the SSL library is NGX_QUIC_ST_UNAVAILABLE,
which is actually a flag used by the ngx_quic_close_quic() function
to prevent cleanup of uninitialized connection.
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Found by Clang Static Analyzer.
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Sections 4.10.1 and 4.10.2 of quic transport describe discarding of initial
and handshake keys. Since the keys are discarded, we no longer need
to retransmit packets and corresponding queues should be emptied.
This patch removes previously added workaround that did not require
acknowledgement for initial packets, resulting in avoiding retransmission,
which is wrong because a packet could be lost and we have to retransmit it.
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It was possible that retransmit timer was not set after the first
retransmission attempt, due to ngx_quic_retransmit() did not set
wait time properly, and the condition in retransmit handler was incorrect.
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Section 17.2 and 17.3 of QUIC transport:
Fixed bit: Packets containing a zero value for this bit are not
valid packets in this version and MUST be discarded.
Reserved bit: An endpoint MUST treat receipt of a packet that has
a non-zero value for these bits, after removing both packet and
header protection, as a connection error of type PROTOCOL_VIOLATION.
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When an error occurs, then c->quic->error field may be populated
with an appropriate error code, and the CONNECTION CLOSE frame will be
sent to the peer before the connection is closed. Otherwise, the error
treated as internal and INTERNAL_ERROR code is sent.
The pkt->error field is populated by functions processing packets to
indicate an error when it does not fit into pass/fail return status.
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The behaviour is toggled with the new directive "quic_retry on|off".
QUIC token construction is made suitable for issuing with NEW_TOKEN.
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As per QUIC transport, the first flight of 0-RTT packets obviously uses same
Destination and Source Connection ID values as the client's first Initial.
The fix is to match 0-RTT against original DCID after it has been switched.
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The ordered frame handler is always called for the existing stream, as it is
allocated from this stream. Instead of searching stream by id, pointer to the
stream node is passed.
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The idea is to skip any zeroes that follow valid QUIC packet. Currently such
behavior can be only observed with Firefox which sends zero-padded initial
packets.
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It was inadvertently changed while working on removing memory allocations.
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It doesn't make sense to store protected flags.
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- we need transport parameters early to get packet size limits at least.
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Previously, macros checking a packet type with the long header also checked
whether this is a long header. Now it requires a separate preceding check.
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Now there's no need to annotate every frame in ACK-eliciting packet.
Sending ACK was moved to the first place, so that queueing ACK frame
no longer postponed up to the next packet after pushing STREAM frames.
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Previously frames in ctx->sent queue could be lost.
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+ added "quic" prefix to all error messages
+ rephrased some messages
+ removed excessive error logging from frame parser
+ added ngx_quic_check_peer() function to check proper source/destination
match and do it one place
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