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As per RFC 2616 / RFC 7233, any range request to an empty file
is expected to result in 416 Range Not Satisfiable response, as
there cannot be a "byte-range-spec whose first-byte-pos is less
than the current length of the entity-body". On the other hand,
this makes use of byte-range requests inconvenient in some cases,
as reported for the slice module here:
http://mailman.nginx.org/pipermail/nginx-devel/2017-June/010177.html
This commit changes range filter to instead return 200 if the file
is empty and the range requested starts at 0.
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This change reworks 13a5f4765887 to only run posted requests once,
with nothing on stack. Running posted requests with other request
functions on stack may result in use-after-free in case of errors,
similar to the one reported in #788.
To only run posted request once, a separate function was introduced
to be used as ssl handshake handler in c->ssl->handler,
ngx_http_upstream_ssl_handshake_handler(). The ngx_http_run_posted_requests()
is only called in this function, and not in ngx_http_upstream_ssl_handshake()
which may be called directly on stack.
Additionaly, ngx_http_upstream_ssl_handshake_handler() now does appropriate
debug logging of the current subrequest, similar to what is done in other
event handlers.
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Previously, the upstream resolve handler always called
ngx_http_run_posted_requests() to run posted requests after processing the
resolver response. However, if the handler was called directly from the
ngx_resolve_name() function (for example, if the resolver response was cached),
running posted requests from the handler could lead to the following errors:
- If the request was scheduled for termination, it could actually be terminated
in the resolve handler. Upper stack frames could reference the freed request
object in this case.
- If a significant number of requests were posted, and for each of them the
resolve handler was called directly from the ngx_resolve_name() function,
posted requests could be run recursively and lead to stack overflow.
Now ngx_http_run_posted_requests() is only called from asynchronously invoked
resolve handlers.
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The flag indicates that the resolve handler is called asynchronously after the
resolve function ngx_resolve_name()/ngx_resolve_addr() exited.
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Trailers added using this directive are evaluated after response body
is processed by output filters (but before it's written to the wire),
so it's possible to use variables calculated from the response body
as the trailer value.
Signed-off-by: Piotr Sikora <piotrsikora@google.com>
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Signed-off-by: Piotr Sikora <piotrsikora@google.com>
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Example:
ngx_table_elt_t *h;
h = ngx_list_push(&r->headers_out.trailers);
if (h == NULL) {
return NGX_ERROR;
}
ngx_str_set(&h->key, "Fun");
ngx_str_set(&h->value, "with trailers");
h->hash = ngx_hash_key_lc(h->key.data, h->key.len);
The code above adds "Fun: with trailers" trailer to the response.
Modules that want to emit trailers must set r->expect_trailers = 1
in header filter, otherwise they might not be emitted for HTTP/1.1
responses that aren't already chunked.
This change also adds $sent_trailer_* variables.
Signed-off-by: Piotr Sikora <piotrsikora@google.com>
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The current style in variable handlers returning NGX_OK is to either set
v->not_found to 1, or to initialize the entire ngx_http_variable_value_t
structure.
In theory, always setting v->valid = 1 for NGX_OK would be useful, which
would mean that the value was computed and is thus valid, including the
special case of v->not_found = 1. But currently that's not the case and
causes the (v->valid || v->not_found) check to access an uninitialized
v->valid value, which is safe only because its value doesn't matter when
v->not_found is set.
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Signed-off-by: Piotr Sikora <piotrsikora@google.com>
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When evaluating a mapped $reset_uid variable in the userid filter,
if get_handler set to ngx_http_map_variable() returned an error,
this previously resulted in a NULL pointer dereference.
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If memory allocation of a new r->uri.data storage failed, reset its length as
well. Request URI is used in ngx_http_finalize_request() for debug logging.
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Previously, when using NGX_HTTP_SSI_ERROR, error was ignored in ssi processing,
thus timefmt could be accessed later in ngx_http_ssi_date_gmt_local_variable()
as part of "set" handler, or NULL format pointer could be passed to strftime().
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Previously, SETTINGS ACK was sent immediately upon receipt of SETTINGS
frame, before already queued DATA frames created using old SETTINGS.
This incorrect behavior was source of interoperability issues, because
peers rely on the fact that new SETTINGS are in effect after receiving
SETTINGS ACK.
Reported by Feng Li.
Signed-off-by: Piotr Sikora <piotrsikora@google.com>
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Signed-off-by: Piotr Sikora <piotrsikora@google.com>
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This avoids sending unnecessary SETTINGS ACK in case of PROTOCOL_ERROR.
Signed-off-by: Piotr Sikora <piotrsikora@google.com>
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Previously, new frames could be emitted in the middle of applying
new (and already acknowledged) SETTINGS params, which is illegal.
Signed-off-by: Piotr Sikora <piotrsikora@google.com>
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Signed-off-by: Piotr Sikora <piotrsikora@google.com>
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Signed-off-by: Piotr Sikora <piotrsikora@google.com>
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Signed-off-by: Piotr Sikora <piotrsikora@google.com>
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If the main request was finalized while a background request performed an
asynchronous operation, the main request ended up in ngx_http_writer() and was
not finalized until a network event or a timeout. For example, cache
background update with aio enabled made nginx unable to process further client
requests or close the connection, keeping it open until client closes it.
Now regular finalization of the main request is not suspended because of an
asynchronous operation in another request.
If a background request was terminated while an asynchronous operation was in
progress, background request's write event handler was changed to
ngx_http_request_finalizer() and never called again.
Now, whenever a request is terminated while an asynchronous operation is in
progress, connection error flag is set to make further finalizations of any
request with this connection lead to termination.
These issues appeared in 1aeaae6e9446 (not yet released).
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In http these checks were changed in a6d6d762c554, though mail module
was missed at that time. Since then, the stream module was introduced
based on mail, using "== NGX_ERROR" check.
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With OpenSSL 1.1.0+, the workaround for handshake buffer size as introduced
in a720f0b0e083 (ticket #413) no longer works, as OpenSSL no longer exposes
handshake buffers, see https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/2e7dc7cd688.
Moreover, it is no longer possible to adjust handshake buffers at all now.
To avoid additional RTT if handshake uses more than 4k we now set TCP_NODELAY
on SSL connections before handshake. While this still results in sub-optimal
network utilization due to incomplete packets being sent, it seems to be
better than nothing.
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Previously, cache background update might not work as expected, making client
wait for it to complete before receiving the final part of a stale response.
This could happen if the response could not be sent to the client socket in one
filter chain call.
Now background cache update is done in a background subrequest. This type of
subrequest does not block any other subrequests or the main request.
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Previously, the read event of the accepted connection was marked ready, but not
available. This made EPOLLRDHUP-related code (for example, in ngx_unix_recv())
expect more data from the socket, leading to unexpected behavior.
For example, if SSL, PROXY protocol and deferred accept were enabled on a listen
socket, the client connection was aborted due to unexpected return value of
c->recv().
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If allocation of cleanup handler in the HTTP/2 header filter failed, then
a stream might be freed with a HEADERS frame left in the output queue.
Now the HEADERS frame is accounted in the queue before trying to allocate
the cleanup handler.
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Abnormally exited workers may leave locked cache entries, this can
result in the cache size on disk exceeding max_size and shared memory
exhaustion.
This change mitigates the issue by ignoring locked entries during forced
expire. It also increases the visibility of the problem by logging such
entries.
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Previously, an allocation error resulted in uninitialized memory access
when evaluating $upstream_http_ variables.
On a related note, see r->headers_out.headers cleanup work in 0cdee26605f3.
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In ac9b1df5b246 (1.13.0) we attempted to allow renegotiation in client mode,
but when using OpenSSL 1.0.2 or older versions it was additionally disabled
by SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS.
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Found by gcc7 (-Wimplicit-fallthrough).
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Particularly, this eliminates difference in behavior for requests without body
and deduplicates code.
Prodded by Piotr Sikora.
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It's required by RFC 7540. While there is no real harm from such frames,
that should help to detect broken clients.
Based on a patch by Piotr Sikora.
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If initialization of a header failed for some reason after ngx_list_push(),
leaving the header as is can result in uninitialized memory access by
the header filter or the log module. The fix is to clear partially
initialized headers in case of errors.
For the Cache-Control header, the fix is to postpone pushing
r->headers_out.cache_control until its value is completed.
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Previously, ngx_http_sub_header_filter() could fail with a partially
initialized context, later accessed in ngx_http_sub_body_filter()
if called from the perl content handler.
The issue had appeared in 2c045e5b8291 (1.9.4).
A better fix would be to handle ngx_http_send_header() errors in
the perl module, though this doesn't seem to be easy enough.
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The SSL_CTRL_SET_CURVES_LIST macro is removed in the OpenSSL master branch.
SSL_CTX_set1_curves_list is preserved as compatibility with previous versions.
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CVE-2009-3555 is no longer relevant and mitigated by the renegotiation
info extension (secure renegotiation). On the other hand, unexpected
renegotiation still introduces potential security risks, and hence we do
not allow renegotiation on the server side, as we never request renegotiation.
On the client side the situation is different though. There are backends
which explicitly request renegotiation, and disabled renegotiation
introduces interoperability problems. This change allows renegotiation
on the client side, and fixes interoperability problems as observed with
such backends (ticket #872).
Additionally, with TLSv1.3 the SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START flag is currently set
by OpenSSL when receiving a NewSessionTicket message, and was detected by
nginx as a renegotiation attempt. This looks like a bug in OpenSSL, though
this change also allows better interoperability till the problem is fixed.
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Support for the TLSv1.3 protocol will be introduced in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
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Previously, the source IP address of a response UDP datagram could differ from
the original datagram destination address. This could happen if the server UDP
socket is bound to a wildcard address and the network interface chosen to output
the response packet has a different default address than the destination address
of the original packet. For example, if two addresses from the same network are
configured on an interface.
Now source address is set explicitly if a response is sent for a server UDP
socket bound to a wildcard address.
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