| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Files | Lines |
|
This makes calling this function similar to other parse functions.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Previously, the expression (ch & 0x7f) was promoted to a signed integer.
Depending on the platform, the size of this integer could be less than 8 bytes,
leading to overflow when handling the higher bits of the result. Also, sign
bit of this integer could be replicated when adding to the 64-bit st->value.
|
|
|
|
Previously it was set when creating the request object. The side-effect was
trying to discard the request body in case of header parse error.
|
|
Previously errors led only to closing streams.
To simplify closing QUIC connection from a QUIC stream context, new macro
ngx_http_v3_finalize_connection() is introduced. It calls
ngx_quic_finalize_connection() for the parent connection.
|
|
|
|
Now it's similar to HTTP/2.
|
|
Previously dynamic table was not functional because of zero limit on its size
set by default. Now the following changes enable it:
- new directives to set SETTINGS_QPACK_MAX_TABLE_CAPACITY and
SETTINGS_QPACK_BLOCKED_STREAMS
- send settings with SETTINGS_QPACK_MAX_TABLE_CAPACITY and
SETTINGS_QPACK_BLOCKED_STREAMS to the client
- send Insert Count Increment to the client
- send Header Acknowledgement to the client
- evict old dynamic table entries on overflow
- decode Required Insert Count from client
- block stream if Required Insert Count is not reached
|
|
Previously bytes were ordered from MSB to LSB, but the right order is the
reverse.
|
|
Client streams may send literal strings which are now limited in size by the
new directive. The default value is 4096.
The directive is similar to HTTP/2 directive http2_max_field_size.
|
|
The macro helps to access a module's server configuration from a QUIC
stream context.
|
|
|
|
This resulted in the frame error due to the invalid DATA frame length.
|
|
This breaks graceful shutdown of QUIC connections in terms of quic-transport.
|
|
In case ngx_hash_add_key() fails, need to goto failed instead of returning,
so that temp_pool will be destoryed.
|
|
Clearing cache based on free space left on a file system is
expected to allow better disk utilization in some cases, notably
when disk space might be also used for something other than nginx
cache (including nginx own temporary files) and while loading
cache (when cache size might be inaccurate for a while, effectively
disabling max_size cache clearing).
Based on a patch by Adam Bambuch.
|
|
The flush flag was not set when forwarding the request body to the uwsgi
server. When using uwsgi_pass suwsgi://..., this causes the uwsgi server
to wait indefinitely for the request body and eventually time out due to
SSL buffering.
This is essentially the same change as 4009:3183165283cc, which was made
to ngx_http_proxy_module.c.
This will fix the uwsgi bug https://github.com/unbit/uwsgi/issues/1490.
|
|
Previously an error was triggered for HTTP/2 when host with port was passed
by client.
|
|
Also, if both are present, require that they have the same value. These
requirements are specified in HTTP/3 draft 28.
Current implementation of HTTP/2 treats ":authority" and "Host"
interchangeably. New checks only make sure at least one of these values is
present in the request. A similar check existed earlier and was limited only
to HTTP/1.1 in 38c0898b6df7.
|
|
The flags was originally added by 8f038068f4bc, and is propagated correctly
in the stream module. With QUIC introduction, http module now uses datagram
sockets as well, thus the fix.
|
|
Draft-27 and draft-28 support can now be enabled interchangeably,
it's based on the compile-time macro NGX_QUIC_DRAFT_VERSION.
|
|
No functional changes.
|
|
|
|
Previously, invalid connection preface errors were only logged at debug
level, providing no visible feedback, in particular, when a plain text
HTTP/2 listening socket is erroneously used for HTTP/1.x connections.
Now these are explicitly logged at the info level, much like other
client-related errors.
|
|
When enabled, certificate status is stored in cache and is used to validate
the certificate in future requests.
New directive ssl_ocsp_cache is added to configure the cache.
|
|
OCSP validation for client certificates is enabled by the "ssl_ocsp" directive.
OCSP responder can be optionally specified by "ssl_ocsp_responder".
When session is reused, peer chain is not available for validation.
If the verified chain contains certificates from the peer chain not available
at the server, validation will fail.
|
|
They should always be allocated from the main QUIC connection pool.
|
|
Preserving pointers within the client buffer is not needed for HTTP/3 because
all data is either allocated from pool or static. Unlike with HTTP/1, data
typically cannot be referenced directly within the client buffer. Trying to
preserve NULLs or external pointers lead to broken pointers.
Also, reverted changes in ngx_http_alloc_large_header_buffer() not relevant
for HTTP/3 to minimize diff to mainstream.
|
|
New field r->parse_start is introduced to substitute r->request_start and
r->header_name_start for request length accounting. These fields only work for
this purpose in HTTP/1 because HTTP/1 request line and header line start with
these values.
Also, error logging is now fixed to output the right part of the request.
|
|
As per HTTP/3 draft 27, a request or response containing uppercase header
field names MUST be treated as malformed. Also, existing rules applied
when parsing HTTP/1 header names are also applied to HTTP/3 header names:
- null character is not allowed
- underscore character may or may not be treated as invalid depending on the
value of "underscores_in_headers"
- all non-alphanumeric characters with the exception of '-' are treated as
invalid
Also, the r->locase_header field is now filled while parsing an HTTP/3
header.
Error logging for invalid headers is fixed as well.
|
|
The first one parses pseudo-headers and is analagous to the request line
parser in HTTP/1. The second one parses regular headers and is analogous to
the header parser in HTTP/1.
Additionally, error handling of client passing malformed uri is now fixed.
|
|
The function ngx_http_parse_chunked() is also called from the proxy module to
parse the upstream response. It should always parse HTTP/1 body in this case.
|
|
Currently there are no such streams, but the function
ngx_http_v3_get_uni_stream() supports them.
|
|
Found by Clang Static Analyzer.
|
|
The behaviour is toggled with the new directive "quic_retry on|off".
QUIC token construction is made suitable for issuing with NEW_TOKEN.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
As per https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7540#section-6.9,
WINDOW_UPDATE received after a frame with the END_STREAM flag
should be handled and not treated as an error.
|
|
As per https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7540#section-8.1,
: A server can send a complete response prior to the client
: sending an entire request if the response does not depend on
: any portion of the request that has not been sent and
: received. When this is true, a server MAY request that the
: client abort transmission of a request without error by
: sending a RST_STREAM with an error code of NO_ERROR after
: sending a complete response (i.e., a frame with the
: END_STREAM flag). Clients MUST NOT discard responses as a
: result of receiving such a RST_STREAM, though clients can
: always discard responses at their discretion for other
: reasons.
Previously, RST_STREAM(NO_ERROR) received from upstream after
a frame with the END_STREAM flag was incorrectly treated as an
error. Now, a single RST_STREAM(NO_ERROR) is properly handled.
This fixes problems observed with modern grpc-c [1], as well
as with the Go gRPC module.
[1] https://github.com/grpc/grpc/pull/1661
|
|
The purpose is to show a precise line number with an invalid value.
|
|
This allows to specify directive values with measurement units.
|
|
|
|
Some parameters have minimal/maximum values defined by standard.
|
|
+ MAX_STREAM_DATA frame is sent when recv() is performed on stream
The new value is a sum of total bytes received by stream + free
space in a buffer;
The sending of MAX_STREM_DATA frame in response to STREAM_DATA_BLOCKED
frame is adjusted to follow the same logic as above.
+ MAX_DATA frame is sent when total amount of received data is 2x
of current limit. The limit is doubled.
+ Default values of transport parameters are adjusted to more meaningful
values:
initial stream limits are set to quic buffer size instead of
unrealistically small 255.
initial max data is decreased to 16 buffer sizes, in an assumption that
this is enough for a relatively short connection, instead of randomly
chosen big number.
All this allows to initiate a stable flow of streams that does not block
on stream/connection limits (tested with FF 77.0a1 and 100K requests)
|
|
|
|
|
|
The request processing is delayed by a timer. Since nginx updates
internal time once at the start of each event loop iteration, this
normally ensures constant time delay, adding a mitigation from
time-based attacks.
A notable exception to this is the case when there are no additional
events before the timer expires. To ensure constant-time processing
in this case as well, we trigger an additional event loop iteration
by posting a dummy event for the next event loop iteration.
|