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Control characters (0x00-0x1f, 0x7f) and space are not expected to appear
in the Host header. Requests with such characters in the Host header are
now unconditionally rejected.
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In 71edd9192f24 logging of invalid headers which were rejected with the
NGX_HTTP_PARSE_INVALID_HEADER error was restricted to just the "client
sent invalid header line" message, without any attempts to log the header
itself.
This patch returns logging of the header up to the invalid character and
the character itself. The r->header_end pointer is now properly set
in all cases to make logging possible.
The same logging is also introduced when parsing headers from upstream
servers.
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Control characters (0x00-0x1f, 0x7f), space, and colon were never allowed in
header names. The only somewhat valid use is header continuation which nginx
never supported and which is explicitly obsolete by RFC 7230.
Previously, such headers were considered invalid and were ignored by default
(as per ignore_invalid_headers directive). With this change, such headers
are unconditionally rejected.
It is expected to make nginx more resilient to various attacks, in particular,
with ignore_invalid_headers switched off (which is inherently unsecure, though
nevertheless sometimes used in the wild).
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Control characters (0x00-0x1f, 0x7f) were never allowed in URIs, and must
be percent-encoded by clients. Further, these are not believed to appear
in practice. On the other hand, passing such characters might make various
attacks possible or easier, despite the fact that currently allowed control
characters are not significant for HTTP request parsing.
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From now on, requests with spaces in URIs are immediately rejected rather
than allowed. Spaces were allowed in 31e9677b15a1 (0.8.41) to handle bad
clients. It is believed that now this behaviour causes more harm than
good.
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HTTP clients are not allowed to generate such requests since Transfer-Encoding
introduction in RFC 2068, and they are not expected to appear in practice
except in attempts to perform a request smuggling attack. While handling of
such requests is strictly defined, the most secure approach seems to reject
them.
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No valid CONNECT requests are expected to appear within nginx, since it
is not a forward proxy. Further, request line parsing will reject
proper CONNECT requests anyway, since we don't allow authority-form of
request-target. On the other hand, RFC 7230 specifies separate message
length rules for CONNECT which we don't support, so make sure to always
reject CONNECTs to avoid potential abuse.
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Previously, TRACE requests were rejected before parsing Transfer-Encoding.
This is not important since keepalive is not enabled at this point anyway,
though rejecting such requests after properly parsing other headers is
less likely to cause issues in case of further code changes.
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After 2096b21fcd10, a single RST_STREAM(NO_ERROR) may not result in an error.
This change removes several unnecessary ctx->type checks for such a case.
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Previously, once received from upstream, it couldn't limit
opening additional streams in a cached keepalive connection.
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Recent fixes to SSL shutdown with lingering close (554c6ae25ffc, 1.19.5)
broke logging of SSL variables. To make sure logging of SSL variables
works properly, avoid freeing c->ssl when doing an SSL shutdown before
lingering close.
Reported by Reinis Rozitis
(http://mailman.nginx.org/pipermail/nginx/2021-May/060670.html).
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The header is escaped in redirects based on request URI or
location name (auto redirect).
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When variables are used in ssl_certificate or ssl_certificate_key, a request
is created in the certificate callback to evaluate the variables, and then
freed. Freeing it, however, updates c->log->action to "closing request",
resulting in confusing error messages like "client timed out ... while
closing request" when a client times out during the SSL handshake.
Fix is to restore c->log->action after calling ngx_http_free_request().
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This saves some memory in typical case when auth_basic_user_file is not
explicitly set, and unifies the code with alcf->realm.
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With this change, it is now possible to use ngx_conf_merge_ptr_value()
to merge complex values. This change follows much earlier changes in
ngx_conf_merge_ptr_value() and ngx_conf_set_str_array_slot()
in 1452:cd586e963db0 (0.6.10) and 1701:40d004d95d88 (0.6.22), and the
change in ngx_conf_set_keyval_slot() (7728:485dba3e2a01, 1.19.4).
To preserve compatibility with existing 3rd party modules, both NULL
and NGX_CONF_UNSET_PTR are accepted for now.
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It turns out no browsers implement HTTP/2 GOAWAY handling properly, and
large enough number of resources on a page results in failures to load
some resources. In particular, Chrome seems to experience errors if
loading of all resources requires more than 1 connection (while it
is usually able to retry requests at least once, even with 2 connections
there are occasional failures for some reason), Safari if loading requires
more than 3 connections, and Firefox if loading requires more than 10
connections (can be configured with network.http.request.max-attempts,
defaults to 10).
It does not seem to be possible to resolve this on nginx side, even strict
limiting of maximum concurrency does not help, and loading issues seems to
be triggered by merely queueing of a request for a particular connection.
The only available mitigation seems to use higher keepalive_requests value.
The new default is 1000 and matches previously used default for
http2_max_requests. It is expected to be enough for 99.98% of the pages
(https://httparchive.org/reports/state-of-the-web?start=latest#reqTotal)
even in Chrome.
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Similar to lingering_time, it limits total connection lifetime before
keepalive is switched off. The default is 1 hour, which is close to
the total maximum connection lifetime possible with default
keepalive_requests and keepalive_timeout.
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Firefox uses several idle streams for PRIORITY frames[1], and
"http2_max_concurrent_streams 1;" results in "client sent too many
PRIORITY frames" errors when a connection is established by Firefox.
Fix is to relax the PRIORITY frames limit to use at least 100 as
the initial value (which is the recommended by the HTTP/2 protocol
minimum limit on the number of concurrent streams, so it is not
unreasonable for clients to assume that similar number of idle streams
can be used for prioritization).
[1] https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/file/32a9e6e145d6e3071c3993a20bb603a2f388722b/netwerk/protocol/http/Http2Stream.cpp#l1270
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In current versions (all versions based on zlib 1.2.11, at least
since 2018) it no longer uses 64K hash and does not force window
bits to 13 if it is less than 13. That is, it needs just 16 bytes
more memory than normal zlib, so these bytes are simply added to
the normal size calculation.
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In limit_req, auth_delay, and upstream code to check for broken
connections, tests for possible connection close by the client
did not work if the connection was already closed when relevant
event handler was set. This happened because there were no additional
events in case of edge-triggered event methods, and read events
were disabled in case of level-triggered ones.
Fix is to explicitly post a read event if the c->read->ready flag
is set.
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For connection close to be reported with eventport on Solaris,
ngx_handle_read_event() needs to be called.
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For new data to be reported with eventport on Solaris,
ngx_handle_read_event() needs to be called after reading response
headers. To do so, ngx_http_upstream_process_non_buffered_upstream()
now called unconditionally if there are no prepread data. This
won't cause any read() syscalls as long as upstream connection
is not ready for reading (c->read->ready is not set), but will result
in proper handling of all events.
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Without explicit handling, a zero timer was actually added, leading to
multiple unneeded syscalls. Further, sending GOAWAY frame early might
be beneficial for clients.
Reported by Sergey Kandaurov.
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Unlike in 75e908236701, which added the logic to ngx_http_finalize_request(),
this change moves it to a more generic routine ngx_http_finalize_connection()
to cover cases when a request is finalized with NGX_DONE.
In particular, this fixes unwanted connection transition into the keepalive
state after receiving EOF while discarding request body. With edge-triggered
event methods that means the connection will last for extra seconds as set in
the keepalive_timeout directive.
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The response size check introduced in 39501ce97e29 did not take into
account possible padding on DATA frames, resulting in incorrect
"upstream sent response body larger than indicated content length" errors
if upstream server used padding in responses with known length.
Fix is to check the actual size of response buffers produced by the code,
similarly to how it is done in other protocols, instead of checking
the size of DATA frames.
Reported at:
http://mailman.nginx.org/pipermail/nginx-devel/2021-March/013907.html
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Sun C complains about "statement not reached" if a "return" is followed
by additional statements.
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With this change, behaviour of HTTP/2 becomes even closer to HTTP/1.x,
and client_header_timeout instead of keepalive_timeout is used before
the first request is received.
This fixes HTTP/2 connections being closed even before the first request
if "keepalive_timeout 0;" was used in the configuration; the problem
appeared in f790816a0e87 (1.19.7).
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Instead, size of one large_client_header_buffers buffer and all large
client header buffers are used.
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Previously, PINGs and other frames extended possible keepalive time,
making it possible to keep an open HTTP/2 connection for a long time.
Now the connection is always closed as long as keepalive_timeout expires,
similarly to how it happens in HTTP/1.x.
Note that as a part of this change, incomplete frames are no longer
trigger a separate timeout, so http2_recv_timeout (replaced by
client_header_timeout in previous patches) is essentially cancelled.
The client_header_timeout is, however, used for SSL handshake and
while reading HEADERS frames.
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Instead, keepalive_timeout and keepalive_requests are now used. This
is expected to simplify HTTP/2 code and usage. This also matches
directives used by upstream module for all protocols.
In case of default settings, this effectively changes maximum number
of requests per connection from 1000 to 100. This looks acceptable,
especially given that HTTP/2 code now properly supports lingering close.
Further, this changes default keepalive timeout in HTTP/2 from 300 seconds
to 75 seconds. This also looks acceptable, and larger than PING interval
used by Firefox (network.http.spdy.ping-threshold defaults to 58s),
the only browser to use PINGs.
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Instead, the client_header_timeout is now used for HTTP/2 reading.
Further, the timeout is changed to be set once till no further data
left to read, similarly to how client_header_timeout is used in other
places.
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The spdy_* directives are not available since introduction of HTTP/2 module
in nginx 1.9.5 more than five years ago.
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New connections are marked reusable by ngx_http_init_connection() if there
are no data available for reading. As a result, if SSL is not used,
ngx_http_v2_init() might be called when the connection is marked reusable.
If a HEADERS frame is immediately available for reading, this resulted
in connection being preserved in reusable state with an active request,
and possibly closed later as if during worker shutdown (that is, after
all active requests were finalized).
Fix is to explicitly mark connections non-reusable in ngx_http_v2_init()
instead of (incorrectly) assuming they are already non-reusable.
Found by Sergey Kandaurov.
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Prodded by Taewoo Kim.
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This is particularly important in HTTP/2, where keepalive connections
are closed with lingering. Before the patch, reusing a keepalive HTTP/2
connection resulted in the connection waiting for lingering close to
remain in the reusable connections queue, preventing ngx_drain_connections()
from closing additional connections.
The patch fixes it by marking the connection reusable again, and so
moving it in the reusable connections queue. Further, it makes actually
possible to reuse such connections if needed.
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This part somehow slipped away from c5840ca2063d.
While it is not expected to be needed in case of lingering close,
it is good to keep it for correctness (see 2b5528023f6b).
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The function has not been updated with introduction of trailers support
in 7034:1b068a4e82d8 (1.13.2).
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Keeping post_accept_timeout in ngx_listening_t is no longer needed since
we've switched to 1 second timeout for deferred accept in 5541:fdb67cfc957d.
Further, using it in HTTP code can result in client_header_timeout being
used from an incorrect server block, notably if address-specific virtual
servers are used along with a wildcard listening socket, or if we've switched
to a different server block based on SNI in SSL handshake.
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The stub status module and ngx_http_send_response() (used by the empty gif
module and the "return" directive) incorrectly assumed that responding
to HEAD requests always results in r->header_only being set. This is not
true, and results in incorrect behaviour, for example, in the following
configuration:
location / {
image_filter size;
return 200 test;
}
Fix is to remove this incorrect micro-optimization from both stub status
module and ngx_http_send_response().
Reported by Chris Newton.
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After 7675:9afa45068b8f and 7678:bffcc5af1d72 (1.19.1), during non-buffered
simple proxying, responses with extra data might result in zero size buffers
being generated and "zero size buf" alerts in writer. This bug is similar
to the one with FastCGI proxying fixed in 7689:da8d758aabeb.
In non-buffered mode, normally the filter function is not called if
u->length is already 0, since u->length is checked after each call of
the filter function. There is a case when this can happen though: if
the response length is 0, and there are pre-read response body data left
after reading response headers. As such, a check for u->length is needed
at the start of non-buffered filter functions, similar to the one
for p->length present in buffered filter functions.
Appropriate checks added to the existing non-buffered copy filters
in the upstream (used by scgi and uwsgi proxying) and proxy modules.
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With introduction of open_file_cache in 1454:f497ed7682a7, opening a file
with ngx_open_cached_file() automatically adds a cleanup handler to close
the file. As such, calling ngx_close_file() directly for non-regular files
is no longer needed and will result in duplicate close() call.
In 1454:f497ed7682a7 ngx_close_file() call for non-regular files was removed
in the static module, but wasn't in the flv module. And the resulting
incorrect code was later copied to the mp4 module. Fix is to remove the
ngx_close_file() call from both modules.
Reported by Chris Newton.
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The ngx_http_parse_complex_uri() function cannot make URI longer and does
not null-terminate URI, so there is no need to allocate an extra byte. This
allocation appears to be a leftover from changes in 461:a88a3e4e158f (0.1.5),
where null-termination of r->uri and many other strings was removed.
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When the request line contains request-target in the absolute-URI form,
it can contain path-empty instead of a single slash (see RFC 7230, RFC 3986).
Previously, the ngx_http_parse_request_line() function only accepted empty
path when there was no query string.
With this change, non-empty query is also correctly handled. That is,
request line "GET http://example.com?foo HTTP/1.1" is accepted and results
in $uri "/" and $args "foo".
Note that $request_uri remains "?foo", similarly to how spaces in URIs
are handled. Providing "/?foo", similarly to how "/" is provided for
"GET http://example.com HTTP/1.1", requires allocation.
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Ensure c->recv is properly reset to ngx_recv if SSL_shutdown()
blocks on writing.
The bug had appeared in 554c6ae25ffc.
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Previously, the number of next_upstream tries included servers marked
as "down", resulting in "no live upstreams" with the code 502 instead
of the code derived from an attempt to connect to the last tried "up"
server (ticket #2096).
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Similarly to the problem fixed in 2096b21fcd10 (ticket #1792),
when a "trailer only" gRPC response (that is, a response with the
END_STREAM flag in the HEADERS frame) was immediately followed by
RST_STREAM(NO_ERROR) in the data preread along with the response
header, RST_STREAM wasn't properly skipped and caused "upstream
rejected request with error 0" errors.
Observed with "unknown service" gRPC errors returned by grpc-go.
Fix is to set ctx->done if we are going to parse additional data,
so the RST_STREAM(NO_ERROR) is properly skipped. Additionally, now
ngx_http_grpc_filter() will complain about frames sent for closed
stream if there are any.
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