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When a worker process is shutting down, keepalive is not used: this is checked
before the ngx_http_set_keepalive() call in ngx_http_finalize_connection().
Yet the "Connection: keep-alive" header was still sent, even if we know that
the worker process is shutting down, potentially resulting in additional
requests being sent to the connection which is going to be closed anyway.
While clients are expected to be able to handle asynchronous close events
(see ticket #1022), it is certainly possible to send the "Connection: close"
header instead, informing the client that the connection is going to be closed
and potentially saving some unneeded work.
With this change, we additionally check for worker process shutdown just
before sending response headers, and disable keepalive accordingly.
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Starting with FreeBSD 11, there is no need to use AIO operations to preload
data into cache for sendfile(SF_NODISKIO) to work. Instead, sendfile()
handles non-blocking loading data from disk by itself. It still can, however,
return EBUSY if a page is already being loaded (for example, by a different
process). If this happens, we now post an event for the next event loop
iteration, so sendfile() is retried "after a short period", as manpage
recommends.
The limit of the number of EBUSY tolerated without any progress is preserved,
but now it does not result in an alert, since on an idle system event loop
iteration might be very short and EBUSY can happen many times in a row.
Instead, SF_NODISKIO is simply disabled for one call once the limit is
reached.
With this change, sendfile(SF_NODISKIO) is now used automatically as long as
sendfile() is enabled, and no longer requires "aio on;".
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ngx_http_v2_huff_decode.c and ngx_http_v2_huff_encode.c are renamed
to ngx_http_huff_decode.c and ngx_http_huff_encode.c.
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With sendfile() in threads ("aio threads; sendfile on;"), client connection
can block on writing, waiting for sendfile() to complete. In HTTP/2 this
might result in the request hang, since an attempt to continue processing
in thread event handler will call request's write event handler, which
is usually stopped by ngx_http_v2_send_chain(): it does nothing if there
are no additional data and stream->queued is set. Further, HTTP/2 resets
stream's c->write->ready to 0 if writing blocks, so just fixing
ngx_http_v2_send_chain() is not enough.
Can be reproduced with test suite on Linux with:
TEST_NGINX_GLOBALS_HTTP="aio threads; sendfile on;" prove h2*.t
The following tests currently fail: h2_keepalive.t, h2_priority.t,
h2_proxy_max_temp_file_size.t, h2.t, h2_trailers.t.
Similarly, sendfile() with AIO preloading on FreeBSD can block as well,
with similar results. This is, however, harder to reproduce, especially
on modern FreeBSD systems, since sendfile() usually does not return EBUSY.
Fix is to modify ngx_http_v2_send_chain() so it actually tries to send
data to the main connection when called, and to make sure that
c->write->ready is set by the relevant event handlers.
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With sendfile in threads, "task already active" alerts might appear in logs
if a write event happens on the main HTTP/2 connection, triggering a sendfile
in threads while another thread operation is already running. Observed
with "aio threads; aio_write on; sendfile on;" and with thread event handlers
modified to post a write event to the main HTTP/2 connection (though can
happen without any modifications).
Similarly, sendfile() with AIO preloading on FreeBSD can trigger duplicate
aio operation, resulting in "second aio post" alerts. This is, however,
harder to reproduce, especially on modern FreeBSD systems, since sendfile()
usually does not return EBUSY.
Fix is to avoid starting a sendfile operation if other thread operation
is active by checking r->aio in the thread handler (and, similarly, in
aio preload handler). The added check also makes duplicate calls protection
redundant, so it is removed.
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The variable contains a negotiated curve used for the handshake key
exchange process. Known curves are listed by their names, unknown
ones are shown in hex.
Note that for resumed sessions in TLSv1.2 and older protocols,
$ssl_curve contains the curve used during the initial handshake,
while in TLSv1.3 it contains the curve used during the session
resumption (see the SSL_get_negotiated_group manual page for
details).
The variable is only meaningful when using OpenSSL 3.0 and above.
With older versions the variable is empty.
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The "sendfile_max_chunk" directive is important to prevent worker
monopolization by fast connections. The 2m value implies maximum 200ms
delay with 100 Mbps links, 20ms delay with 1 Gbps links, and 2ms on
10 Gbps links. It also seems to be a good value for disks.
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Previously, connections to upstream servers used sendfile() if it was
enabled, but never honored sendfile_max_chunk. This might result
in worker monopolization for a long time if large request bodies
are allowed.
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Previously, it was checked that sendfile_max_chunk was enabled and
almost whole sendfile_max_chunk was sent (see e67ef50c3176), to avoid
delaying connections where sendfile_max_chunk wasn't reached (for example,
when sending responses smaller than sendfile_max_chunk). Now we instead
check if there are unsent data, and the connection is still ready for writing.
Additionally we also check c->write->delayed to ignore connections already
delayed by limit_rate.
This approach is believed to be more robust, and correctly handles
not only sendfile_max_chunk, but also internal limits of c->send_chain(),
such as sendfile() maximum supported length (ticket #1870).
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Previously, 1 millisecond delay was used instead. In certain edge cases
this might result in noticeable performance degradation though, notably on
Linux with typical CONFIG_HZ=250 (so 1ms delay becomes 4ms),
sendfile_max_chunk 2m, and link speed above 2.5 Gbps.
Using posted next events removes the artificial delay and makes processing
fast in all cases.
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The directive enables including all frames from start time to the most recent
key frame in the result. Those frames are removed from presentation timeline
using mp4 edit lists.
Edit lists are currently supported by popular players and browsers such as
Chrome, Safari, QuickTime and ffmpeg. Among those not supporting them properly
is Firefox[1].
Based on a patch by Tracey Jaquith, Internet Archive.
[1] https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1735300
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The function updates the duration field of mdhd atom. Previously it was
updated in ngx_http_mp4_read_mdhd_atom(). The change makes it possible to
alter track duration as a result of processing track frames.
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Requires OpenSSL 3.0 compiled with "enable-ktls" option. Further, KTLS
needs to be enabled in kernel, and in OpenSSL, either via OpenSSL
configuration file or with "ssl_conf_command Options KTLS;" in nginx
configuration.
On FreeBSD, kernel TLS is available starting with FreeBSD 13.0, and
can be enabled with "sysctl kern.ipc.tls.enable=1" and "kldload ktls_ocf"
to load a software backend, see man ktls(4) for details.
On Linux, kernel TLS is available starting with kernel 4.13 (at least 5.2
is recommended), and needs kernel compiled with CONFIG_TLS=y (with
CONFIG_TLS=m, which is used at least on Ubuntu 21.04 by default,
the tls module needs to be loaded with "modprobe tls").
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This is a recommended behavior by RFC 7301 and is useful
for mitigation of protocol confusion attacks [1].
To avoid possible negative effects, list of supported protocols
was extended to include all possible HTTP protocol ALPN IDs
registered by IANA [2], i.e. "http/1.0" and "http/0.9".
[1] https://alpaca-attack.com/
[2] https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-extensiontype-values/
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The variable contains protocol selected by ALPN during handshake and
is empty otherwise.
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NPN was replaced with ALPN, published as RFC 7301 in July 2014.
It used to negotiate SPDY (and, in transition, HTTP/2).
NPN supported appeared in OpenSSL 1.0.1. It does not work with TLSv1.3 [1].
ALPN is supported since OpenSSL 1.0.2.
The NPN support was dropped in Firefox 53 [2] and Chrome 51 [3].
[1] https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/3665.
[2] https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1248198
[3] https://www.chromestatus.com/feature/5767920709795840
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In b87b7092cedb (nginx 1.21.1), logging level of "upstream sent invalid
header" errors was accidentally changed to "info". This change restores
the "error" level, which is a proper logging level for upstream-side
errors.
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The u->keepalive flag is initialized early if the response has no body
(or an empty body), and needs to be reset if there are any extra data,
similarly to how it is done in ngx_http_proxy_copy_filter(). Missed
in 83c4622053b0.
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Do this only when the entire request body is empty and
r->request_body_in_file_only is set.
The issue manifested itself with missing warning "a client request body is
buffered to a temporary file" when the entire rb->buf is full and all buffers
are delayed by a filter.
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The request body filter chain is no longer called after processing
a DATA frame. Instead, we now post a read event to do this. This
ensures that multiple small DATA frames read during the same event loop
iteration are coalesced together, resulting in much faster processing.
Since rb->buf can now contain unprocessed data, window update is no
longer sent in ngx_http_v2_state_read_data() in case of flow control
being used due to filter buffering. Instead, window will be updated
by ngx_http_v2_read_client_request_body_handler() in the posted read
event.
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Following rb->filter_need_buffering changes, request body reading is
only finished after the filter chain is called and rb->last_saved is set.
As such, with r->request_body_no_buffering, timer on fc->read is no
longer removed when the last part of the body is received, potentially
resulting in incorrect behaviour.
The fix is to call ngx_http_v2_process_request_body() from the
ngx_http_v2_read_unbuffered_request_body() function instead of
directly calling ngx_http_v2_filter_request_body(), so the timer
is properly removed.
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In the body read handler, the window was incorrectly calculated
based on the full buffer size instead of the amount of free space
in the buffer. If the request body is buffered by a filter, and
the buffer is not empty after the read event is generated by the
filter to resume request body processing, this could result in
"http2 negative window update" alerts.
Further, in the body ready handler and in ngx_http_v2_state_read_data()
the buffer wasn't cleared when the data were already written to disk,
so the client might stuck without window updates.
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Prodded by Clang Static Analyzer.
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If a filter wants to buffer the request body during reading (for
example, to check an external scanner), it can now do so. To make
it possible, the code now checks rb->last_saved (introduced in the
previous change) along with rb->rest == 0.
Since in HTTP/2 this requires flow control to avoid overflowing the
request body buffer, so filters which need buffering have to set
the rb->filter_need_buffering flag on the first filter call. (Note
that each filter is expected to call the next filter, so all filters
will be able set the flag if needed.)
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It indicates that the last buffer was received by the save filter,
and can be used to check this at higher levels. To be used in the
following changes.
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If due to an error ngx_http_request_body_save_filter() is called
more than once with rb->rest == 0, this used to result in a segmentation
fault. Added an alert to catch such errors, just in case.
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Previously, fully preread unbuffered requests larger than client body
buffer size were saved to disk, despite the fact that "unbuffered" is
expected to imply no disk buffering.
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The save body filter saves the request body to disk once the buffer is full.
Yet in HTTP/2 this might happen even if there is no need to save anything
to disk, notably when content length is known and the END_STREAM flag is
sent in a separate empty DATA frame. Workaround is to provide additional
byte in the buffer, so saving the request body won't be triggered.
This fixes unexpected request body disk buffering in HTTP/2 observed after
the previous change when content length is known and the END_STREAM flag
is sent in a separate empty DATA frame.
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In particular, now the code always uses a buffer limited by
client_body_buffer_size. At the cost of an additional copy it
ensures that small DATA frames are not directly mapped to small
write() syscalls, but rather buffered in memory before writing.
Further, requests without Content-Length are no longer forced
to use temporary files.
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With SSL it is possible that an established connection is ready for
reading after the handshake. Further, events might be already disabled
in case of level-triggered event methods. If this happens and
ngx_http_upstream_send_request() blocks waiting for some data from
the upstream, such as flow control in case of gRPC, the connection
will time out due to no read events on the upstream connection.
Fix is to explicitly check the c->read->ready flag if sending request
blocks and post a read event if it is set.
Note that while it is possible to modify ngx_ssl_handshake() to keep
read events active, this won't completely resolve the issue, since
there can be data already received during the SSL handshake
(see 573bd30e46b4).
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To load old/weak server or client certificates it might be needed to adjust
the security level, as introduced in OpenSSL 1.1.0. This change ensures that
ciphers are set before loading the certificates, so security level changes
via the cipher string apply to certificate loading.
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The latest HTTP/1.1 draft describes Transfer-Encoding in HTTP/1.0 as having
potentially faulty message framing as that could have been forwarded without
handling of the chunked encoding, and forbids processing subsequest requests
over that connection: https://github.com/httpwg/http-core/issues/879.
While handling of such requests is permitted, the most secure approach seems
to reject them.
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Control characters (0x00-0x1f, 0x7f) and space are not expected to appear
in the Host header. Requests with such characters in the Host header are
now unconditionally rejected.
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In 71edd9192f24 logging of invalid headers which were rejected with the
NGX_HTTP_PARSE_INVALID_HEADER error was restricted to just the "client
sent invalid header line" message, without any attempts to log the header
itself.
This patch returns logging of the header up to the invalid character and
the character itself. The r->header_end pointer is now properly set
in all cases to make logging possible.
The same logging is also introduced when parsing headers from upstream
servers.
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Control characters (0x00-0x1f, 0x7f), space, and colon were never allowed in
header names. The only somewhat valid use is header continuation which nginx
never supported and which is explicitly obsolete by RFC 7230.
Previously, such headers were considered invalid and were ignored by default
(as per ignore_invalid_headers directive). With this change, such headers
are unconditionally rejected.
It is expected to make nginx more resilient to various attacks, in particular,
with ignore_invalid_headers switched off (which is inherently unsecure, though
nevertheless sometimes used in the wild).
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Control characters (0x00-0x1f, 0x7f) were never allowed in URIs, and must
be percent-encoded by clients. Further, these are not believed to appear
in practice. On the other hand, passing such characters might make various
attacks possible or easier, despite the fact that currently allowed control
characters are not significant for HTTP request parsing.
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From now on, requests with spaces in URIs are immediately rejected rather
than allowed. Spaces were allowed in 31e9677b15a1 (0.8.41) to handle bad
clients. It is believed that now this behaviour causes more harm than
good.
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HTTP clients are not allowed to generate such requests since Transfer-Encoding
introduction in RFC 2068, and they are not expected to appear in practice
except in attempts to perform a request smuggling attack. While handling of
such requests is strictly defined, the most secure approach seems to reject
them.
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No valid CONNECT requests are expected to appear within nginx, since it
is not a forward proxy. Further, request line parsing will reject
proper CONNECT requests anyway, since we don't allow authority-form of
request-target. On the other hand, RFC 7230 specifies separate message
length rules for CONNECT which we don't support, so make sure to always
reject CONNECTs to avoid potential abuse.
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Previously, TRACE requests were rejected before parsing Transfer-Encoding.
This is not important since keepalive is not enabled at this point anyway,
though rejecting such requests after properly parsing other headers is
less likely to cause issues in case of further code changes.
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After 2096b21fcd10, a single RST_STREAM(NO_ERROR) may not result in an error.
This change removes several unnecessary ctx->type checks for such a case.
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Previously, once received from upstream, it couldn't limit
opening additional streams in a cached keepalive connection.
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Recent fixes to SSL shutdown with lingering close (554c6ae25ffc, 1.19.5)
broke logging of SSL variables. To make sure logging of SSL variables
works properly, avoid freeing c->ssl when doing an SSL shutdown before
lingering close.
Reported by Reinis Rozitis
(http://mailman.nginx.org/pipermail/nginx/2021-May/060670.html).
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The header is escaped in redirects based on request URI or
location name (auto redirect).
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