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Previously, the stream's window was kept zero in order to prevent a client
from sending the request body before it was requested (see 887cca40ba6a for
details). Until such initial window was acknowledged all requests with
data were rejected (see 0aa07850922f for details).
That approach revealed a number of problems:
1. Some clients (notably MS IE/Edge, Safari, iOS applications) show an error
or even crash if a stream is rejected;
2. This requires at least one RTT for every request with body before the
client receives window update and able to send data.
To overcome these problems the new directive "http2_body_preread_size" is
introduced. It sets the initial window and configures a special per stream
preread buffer that is used to save all incoming data before the body is
requested and processed.
If the directive's value is lower than the default initial window (65535),
as previously, all streams with data will be rejected until the new window
is acknowledged. Otherwise, no special processing is used and all requests
with data are welcome right from the connection start.
The default value is chosen to be 64k, which is bigger than the default
initial window. Setting it to zero is fully complaint to the previous
behavior.
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Now, the module extracts optional port which may accompany an
IP address. This custom extension is introduced, among other
things, in order to facilitate logging of original client ports.
Addresses with ports are expected to be in the RFC 3986 format,
that is, with IPv6 addresses in square brackets. E.g.,
"X-Real-IP: [2001:0db8::1]:12345" sets client port ($remote_port)
to 12345.
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Previously, when the client address was changed to the one from
the PROXY protocol header, the client port ($remote_port) was
reset to zero. Now the client port is also changed to the one
from the PROXY protocol header.
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It's properly aligned and can hold any supported sockaddr.
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Since 4fbef397c753 nginx rejects with the 400 error any attempts of
requesting different host over the same connection, if the relevant
virtual server requires verification of a client certificate.
While requesting hosts other than negotiated isn't something legal
in HTTP/1.x, the HTTP/2 specification explicitly permits such requests
for connection reuse and has introduced a special response code 421.
According to RFC 7540 Section 9.1.2 this code can be sent by a server
that is not configured to produce responses for the combination of
scheme and authority that are included in the request URI. And the
client may retry the request over a different connection.
Now this code is used for requests that aren't authorized in current
connection. After receiving the 421 response a client will be able
to open a new connection, provide the required certificate and retry
the request.
Unfortunately, not all clients currently are able to handle it well.
Notably Chrome just shows an error, while at least the latest version
of Firefox retries the request over a new connection.
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OpenSSL 1.0.2+ allows configuring a curve list instead of a single curve
previously supported. This allows use of different curves depending on
what client supports (as available via the elliptic_curves extension),
and also allows use of different curves in an ECDHE key exchange and
in the ECDSA certificate.
The special value "auto" was introduced (now the default for ssl_ecdh_curve),
which means "use an internal list of curves as available in the OpenSSL
library used". For versions prior to OpenSSL 1.0.2 it maps to "prime256v1"
as previously used. The default in 1.0.2b+ prefers prime256v1 as well
(and X25519 in OpenSSL 1.1.0+).
As client vs. server preference of curves is controlled by the
same option as used for ciphers (SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
the ssl_prefer_server_ciphers directive now controls both.
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Both minor and major versions are now limited to 999 maximum. In case of
r->http_minor, this limit is already implied by the code. Major version,
r->http_major, in theory can be up to 65535 with current code, but such
values are very unlikely to become real (and, additionally, such values
are not allowed by RFC 7230), so the same test was used for r->http_major.
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When it's known that the kernel supports EPOLLRDHUP, there is no need in
additional recv() call to get EOF or error when the flag is absent in the
event generated by the kernel. A special runtime test is done at startup
to detect if EPOLLRDHUP is actually supported by the kernel because
epoll_ctl() silently ignores unknown flags.
With this knowledge it's now possible to drop the "ready" flag for partial
read. Previously, the "ready" flag was kept until the recv() returned EOF
or error. In particular, this change allows the lingering close heuristics
(which relies on the "ready" flag state) to actually work on Linux, and not
wait for more data in most cases.
The "available" flag is now used in the read event with the semantics similar
to the corresponding counter in kqueue.
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The variable contains text representation based on random data, usable as
a unique request identifier.
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This parameter lets binding the proxy connection to a non-local address.
Upstream will see the connection as coming from that address.
When used with $remote_addr, upstream will accept the connection from real
client address.
Example:
proxy_bind $remote_addr transparent;
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In addition, errors occurred while setting bind address are no longer ignored.
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The WINDOW_UPDATE frame could be left in the output queue for an indefinite
period of time resulting in the request timeout.
This might happen if reading of the body was triggered by an event unrelated
to client connection, e.g. by the limit_req timer.
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This prevents possible processing of such frames and triggering
rb->post_handler if an error occurred during r->request_body
initialization.
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Particularly this prevents sending WINDOW_UPDATE with zero delta
which can result in PROTOCOL_ERROR.
Also removed surplus setting of no_flow_control to 0.
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Refusing streams is known to be incorrectly handled at least by IE, Edge
and Safari. Make sure to provide appropriate logging to simplify fixing
this in the affected browsers.
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After the 92464ebace8e change, it has been discovered that not all
clients follow the RFC and handle RST_STREAM with NO_ERROR properly.
Notably, Chrome currently interprets it as INTERNAL_ERROR and discards
the response.
As a workaround, instead of RST_STREAM the maximum stream window update
will be sent, which will let client to send up to 2 GB of a request body
data before getting stuck on flow control. All the received data will
be silently discarded.
See for details:
http://mailman.nginx.org/pipermail/nginx-devel/2016-April/008143.html
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=603182
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A client is allowed to send requests before receiving and acknowledging
the SETTINGS frame. Such a client having a wrong idea about the stream's
could send the request body that nginx isn't ready to process.
The previous behavior was to send RST_STREAM with FLOW_CONTROL_ERROR in
such case, but it didn't allow retrying requests that have been rejected.
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No functional changes.
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This prevents forming empty records out of such buffers. Particularly it fixes
double end-of-stream records with chunked transfer encoding, or when HTTP/2 is
used and the END_STREAM flag has been sent without data. In both cases there
is an empty buffer at the end of the request body chain with the "last_buf"
flag set.
The canonical libfcgi, as well as php implementation, tolerates such records,
while the HHVM parser is more strict and drops the connection (ticket #950).
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There are two improvements:
1. Support for request body filters;
2. Receiving of request body is started only after
the ngx_http_read_client_request_body() call.
The last one fixes the problem when the client_max_body_size value might not be
respected from the right location if the location was changed either during the
process of receiving body or after the whole body had been received.
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RFC 7540 states that "A server can send a complete response prior to the client
sending an entire request if the response does not depend on any portion of the
request that has not been sent and received. When this is true, a server MAY
request that the client abort transmission of a request without error by sending
a RST_STREAM with an error code of NO_ERROR after sending a complete response
(i.e., a frame with the END_STREAM flag)."
This should prevent a client from blocking on the stream window, since it isn't
maintained for closed streams. Currently, quite big initial stream windows are
used, so such blocking is very unlikly, but that will be changed in the further
patches.
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OpenSSL removed support for all 40 and 56 bit ciphers.
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By default, requests with non-idempotent methods (POST, LOCK, PATCH)
are no longer retried in case of errors if a request was already sent
to a backend. Previous behaviour can be restored by using
"proxy_next_upstream ... non_idempotent".
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Much like normal connections, cached connections are now tested against
u->conf->next_upstream, and u->state->status is now always set.
This allows to disable additional tries even with upstream keepalive
by using "proxy_next_upstream off".
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Backed out changesets: cf3e75cfa951, 6b72414dfb4f, 602dc42035fe, e5076b96fd01.
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An empty value will be treated as "off".
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When a keys_zone is full then each next request to the cache is
penalized. That is, the cache has to evict older files to get a
slot from the keys_zone synchronously. The patch introduces new
behavior in this scenario. Manager will try to maintain available
free slots in the keys_zone by cleaning old files in the background.
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