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In "co64" atom chunk start offset is a 64-bit unsigned integer. When trimming
the "mdat" atom, chunk offsets are casted to off_t values which are typically
64-bit signed integers. A specially crafted mp4 file with huge chunk offsets
may lead to off_t overflow and result in negative trim boundaries.
The consequences of the overflow are:
- Incorrect Content-Length header value in the response.
- Negative left boundary of the response file buffer holding the trimmed "mdat".
This leads to pread()/sendfile() errors followed by closing the client
connection.
On rare systems where off_t is a 32-bit integer, this scenario is also feasible
with the "stco" atom.
The fix is to add checks which make sure data chunks referenced by each track
are within the mp4 file boundaries. Additionally a few more checks are added to
ensure mp4 file consistency and log errors.
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These checks were missed when chunked support was introduced. And also
added an explicit error message to ngx_http_dav_copy_move_handler()
(it was missed for some reason, in contrast to DELETE and MKCOL handlers).
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While empty replacements were caught at run-time, parsing code
of the "rewrite" directive expects that a minimum length of the
"replacement" argument is 1.
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Returning 500 instead of NGX_ERROR is preferable here because
header has not yet been sent to the client.
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In configurations when "root" has variables, some modules unnecessarily
allocated memory for the "Location" header value.
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Instead of reducing URI length to not include the terminating '\0'
character in 6ddaac3e0bf7, restore the terminating '/' character.
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Previously, connections returned from keepalive cache had c->data
pointing to the keepalive cache item. While this shouldn't be a problem
for correct code, as c->data is not expected to be used before it is set,
explicitly clearing it might help to avoid confusion.
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Previously only an rbtree was associated with a limit_conn. To make it
possible to associate more data with a limit_conn, shared context is introduced
similar to limit_req. Also, shared pool pointer is kept in a way similar to
limit_req.
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The variable takes one of the values: PASSED, REJECTED or REJECTED_DRY_RUN.
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A new directive limit_conn_dry_run allows enabling the dry run mode. In this
mode connections are not rejected, but reject status is logged as usual.
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The variable takes one of the values: PASSED, DELAYED, REJECTED,
DELAYED_DRY_RUN or REJECTED_DRY_RUN.
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Now a new structure ngx_proxy_protocol_t holds these fields. This allows
to add more PROXY protocol fields in the future without modifying the
connection structure.
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After ac5a741d39cf it is now possible that after zstream.avail_out
reaches 0 and we allocate additional buffer, there will be no more data
to put into this buffer, triggering "zero size buf" alert. Fix is to
reset b->temporary flag in this case.
Additionally, an optimization added to avoid allocating additional buffer
in this case, by checking if last deflate() call returned Z_STREAM_END.
Note that checking for Z_STREAM_END by itself is not enough to fix alerts,
as deflate() can return Z_STREAM_END without producing any output if the
buffer is smaller than gzip trailer.
Reported by Witold Filipczyk,
http://mailman.nginx.org/pipermail/nginx-devel/2019-July/012469.html.
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Due to shortcomings of the ccv->zero flag implementation in complex value
interface, length of the resulting string from ngx_http_complex_value()
might either not include terminating null character or include it,
so the only safe way to work with the result is to use it as a
null-terminated string.
Reported by Patrick Wollgast.
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When "-" follows a parameter of maximum length, a single byte buffer
overflow happens, since the error branch does not check parameter length.
Fix is to avoid saving "-" to the parameter key, and instead use an error
message with "-" explicitly written. The message is mostly identical to
one used in similar cases in the preequal state.
Reported by Patrick Wollgast.
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When nginx is used with zlib patched with [1], which provides
integration with the future IBM Z hardware deflate acceleration, it ends
up computing CRC32 twice: one time in hardware, which always does this,
and one time in software by explicitly calling crc32().
crc32() calls were added in changesets 133:b27548f540ad ("nginx-0.0.1-
2003-09-24-23:51:12 import") and 134:d57c6835225c ("nginx-0.0.1-
2003-09-26-09:45:21 import") as part of gzip wrapping feature - back
then zlib did not support it.
However, since then gzip wrapping was implemented in zlib v1.2.0.4,
and it's already being used by nginx for log compression.
This patch replaces hand-written gzip wrapping with the one provided by
zlib. It simplifies the code, and makes it avoid computing CRC32 twice
when using hardware acceleration.
[1] https://github.com/madler/zlib/pull/410
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Similarly to the change in 5491:74bfa803a5aa (1.5.9), we should accept
properly escaped URIs and unescape them as needed, else it is not possible
to handle URIs with question marks.
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As we now have ctx->header_sent flag, it is further used to prevent
duplicate $r->send_http_header() calls, prevent output before sending
header, and $r->internal_redirect() after sending header.
Further, $r->send_http_header() protected from calls after
$r->internal_redirect().
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Returning NGX_HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR if a perl code died after
sending header will lead to a "header already sent" alert. To avoid
it, we now check if header was already sent, and return NGX_ERROR
instead if it was.
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Previously, redirects scheduled with $r->internal_redirect() were followed
even if the code then died. Now these are ignored and nginx will return
an error instead.
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Variable handlers are not expected to send anything to the client, cannot
sleep or read body, and are not expected to modify the request. Added
appropriate protection to prevent accidental foot shooting.
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Duplicate $r->sleep() and/or $r->has_request_body() calls result
in undefined behaviour (in practice, connection leaks were observed).
To prevent this, croak() added in appropriate places.
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Previously, allocation errors in nginx.xs were more or less ignored,
potentially resulting in incorrect code execution in specific low-memory
conditions. This is changed to use ctx->error bit and croak(), similarly
to how output errors are now handled.
Note that this is mostly a cosmetic change, as Perl itself exits on memory
allocation errors, and hence nginx with Perl is hardly usable in low-memory
conditions.
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When an error happens, the ctx->error bit is now set, and croak()
is called to terminate further processing. The ctx->error bit is
checked in ngx_http_perl_call_handler() to cancel further processing,
and is also checked in various output functions - to make sure these won't
be called if croak() was handled by an eval{} in perl code.
In particular, this ensures that output chain won't be called after
errors, as filters might not expect this to happen. This fixes some
segmentation faults under low memory conditions. Also this stops
request processing after filter finalization or request body reading
errors.
For cases where an HTTP error status can be additionally returned (for
example, 416 (Requested Range Not Satisfiable) from the range filter),
the ctx->status field is also added.
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This ensures that correct ctx is always available, including after
filter finalization. In particular, this fixes a segmentation fault
with the following configuration:
location / {
image_filter test;
perl 'sub {
my $r = shift;
$r->send_http_header();
$r->print("foo\n");
$r->print("bar\n");
}';
}
This also seems to be the only way to correctly handle filter finalization
in various complex cases, for example, when embedded perl is used both
in the original handler and in an error page called after filter
finalization.
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The NGX_DONE test in ngx_http_perl_handle_request() was introduced
in 1702:86bb52e28ce0, which also modified ngx_http_perl_call_handler()
to return NGX_DONE with c->destroyed. The latter part was then
removed in 3050:f54b02dbb12b, so NGX_DONE test is no longer needed.
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Embedded perl does not set any request fields needed for conditional
requests processing. Further, filter finalization in the not_modified
filter can cause segmentation faults due to cleared ctx as in
ticket #1786.
Before 5fb1e57c758a (1.7.3) the not_modified filter was implicitly disabled
for perl responses, as r->headers_out.last_modified_time was -1. This
change restores this behaviour by using the explicit r->disable_not_modified
flag.
Note that this patch doesn't try to address perl module robustness against
filter finalization and other errors returned from filter chains. It should
be eventually reworked to handle errors instead of ignoring them.
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A new directive limit_req_dry_run allows enabling the dry run mode. In this
mode requests are neither rejected nor delayed, but reject/delay status is
logged as usual.
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In ngx_http_range_singlepart_body() special buffers where passed
unmodified, including ones after the end of the range. As such,
if the last buffer of a response was sent separately as a special
buffer, two buffers with b->last_buf set were present in the response.
In particular, this might result in a duplicate final chunk when using
chunked transfer encoding (normally range filter and chunked transfer
encoding are not used together, but this may happen if there are trailers
in the response). This also likely to cause problems in HTTP/2.
Fix is to skip all special buffers after we've sent the last part of
the range requested. These special buffers are not meaningful anyway,
since we set b->last_buf in the buffer with the last part of the range,
and everything is expected to be flushed due to it.
Additionally, ngx_http_next_body_filter() is now called even
if no buffers are to be passed to it. This ensures that various
write events are properly propagated through the filter chain. In
particular, this fixes test failures observed with the above change
and aio enabled.
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Filters are not allowed to change incoming chain links, and should allocate
their own links if any modifications are needed. Nevertheless
ngx_http_range_singlepart_body() modified incoming chain links in some
cases, notably at the end of the requested range.
No problems caused by this are currently known, mostly because of
limited number of possible modifications and the position of the range
body filter in the filter chain. Though this behaviour is clearly incorrect
and tests demonstrate that it can at least cause some proxy buffers being
lost when using proxy_force_ranges, leading to less effective handling
of responses.
Fix is to always allocate new chain links in ngx_http_range_singlepart_body().
Links are explicitly freed to ensure constant memory usage with long-lived
requests.
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If ngx_pool_cleanup_add() fails, we have to clean just created SSL context
manually, thus appropriate call added.
Additionally, ngx_pool_cleanup_add() moved closer to ngx_ssl_create() in
the ngx_http_ssl_module, to make sure there are no leaks due to intermediate
code.
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A virtual server may have no SSL context if it does not have certificates
defined, so we have to use config of the ngx_http_ssl_module from the
SSL context in the certificate callback. To do so, it is now passed as
the argument of the callback.
The stream module doesn't really need any changes, but was modified as
well to match http code.
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Dynamic certificates re-introduce problem with incorrect session
reuse (AKA "virtual host confusion", CVE-2014-3616), since there are
no server certificates to generate session id context from.
To prevent this, session id context is now generated from ssl_certificate
directives as specified in the configuration. This approach prevents
incorrect session reuse in most cases, while still allowing sharing
sessions across multiple machines with ssl_session_ticket_key set as
long as configurations are identical.
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Passwords have to be copied to the configuration pool to be used
at runtime. Also, to prevent blocking on stdin (with "daemon off;")
an empty password list is provided.
To make things simpler, password handling was modified to allow
an empty array (with 0 elements and elts set to NULL) as an equivalent
of an array with 1 empty password.
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To evaluate variables, a request is created in the certificate callback,
and then freed. To do this without side effects on the stub_status
counters and connection state, an additional function was introduced,
ngx_http_alloc_request().
Only works with OpenSSL 1.0.2+, since there is no SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb()
in older versions.
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Previous interface of ngx_open_dir() assumed that passed directory name
has a room for NGX_DIR_MASK at the end (NGX_DIR_MASK_LEN bytes). While all
direct users of ngx_dir_open() followed this interface, this also implied
similar requirements for indirect uses - in particular, via ngx_walk_tree().
Currently none of ngx_walk_tree() uses provides appropriate space, and
fixing this does not look like a right way to go. Instead, ngx_dir_open()
interface was changed to not require any additional space and use
appropriate allocations instead.
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Previously, AF_UNIX addresses misbehaved as AF_INET, which typically resulted
in $uid_set composed from the middle of sun_path.
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Previously, AF_UNIX client addresses were handled as AF_INET, leading
to unexpected results.
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On 32-bit platforms mp4->buffer_pos might overflow when a large
enough (close to 4 gigabytes) atom is being skipped, resulting in
incorrect memory addesses being read further in the code. In most
cases this results in harmless errors being logged, though may also
result in a segmentation fault if hitting unmapped pages.
To address this, ngx_mp4_atom_next() now only increments mp4->buffer_pos
up to mp4->buffer_end. This ensures that overflow cannot happen.
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This parameter specifies an additional "soft" burst limit at which requests
become delayed (but not yet rejected as it happens if "burst=" limit is
exceeded). Defaults to 0, i.e., all excess requests are delayed.
Originally inspired by Vladislav Shabanov
(http://mailman.nginx.org/pipermail/nginx-devel/2016-April/008126.html).
Further improved based on a patch by Peter Shchuchkin
(http://mailman.nginx.org/pipermail/nginx-devel/2018-October/011522.html).
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Previously there was no validation for the size of a 64-bit atom
in an mp4 file. This could lead to a CPU hog when the size is 0,
or various other problems due to integer underflow when calculating
atom data size, including segmentation fault or worker process
memory disclosure.
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