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Previously a single STREAM frame was created for each buffer in stream output
chain which is wasteful with respect to memory. The following changes were
made in the stream send code:
- ngx_quic_stream_send_chain() no longer calls ngx_quic_stream_send() and got
a separate implementation that coalesces neighbouring buffers into a single
frame
- the new ngx_quic_stream_send_chain() respects the limit argument, which fixes
sendfile_max_chunk and limit_rate
- ngx_quic_stream_send() is reimplemented to call ngx_quic_stream_send_chain()
- stream frame size limit is moved out to a separate function
ngx_quic_max_stream_frame()
- flow control is moved out to a separate function ngx_quic_max_stream_flow()
- ngx_quic_stream_send_chain() is relocated next to ngx_quic_stream_send()
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A packet size is kept in one of the frames belonging to the packet.
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This applies to discarding Initial and Handshake keys.
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Previously, bidirectional shutdown never worked, due to two issues
in the code:
1. The code only tested SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ and SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE
when there was an error in the error queue, which cannot happen.
The bug was introduced in an attempt to fix unexpected error logging
as reported with OpenSSL 0.9.8g
(http://mailman.nginx.org/pipermail/nginx/2008-January/003084.html).
2. The code never called SSL_shutdown() for the second time to wait for
the peer's close_notify alert.
This change fixes both issues.
Note that after this change bidirectional shutdown is expected to work for
the first time, so c->ssl->no_wait_shutdown now makes a difference. This
is not a problem for HTTP code which always uses c->ssl->no_wait_shutdown,
but might be a problem for stream and mail code, as well as 3rd party
modules.
To minimize the effect of the change, the timeout, which was used to be 30
seconds and not configurable, though never actually used, is now set to
3 seconds. It is also expanded to apply to both SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ and
SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE, so timeout is properly set if writing to the socket
buffer is not possible.
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For RESET_STREAM the c->read->error flag is set.
For STOP_SENDING the c->write->error flag is set.
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Creating client-initiated streams is moved from ngx_quic_handle_stream_frame()
to a separate function ngx_quic_create_client_stream(). This function is
responsible for creating streams with lower ids as well.
Also, simplified and fixed initial data buffering in
ngx_quic_handle_stream_frame(). It is now done before calling the initial
handler as the handler can destroy the stream.
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Previously this function generated an error trying to figure out if client shut
down the write end of the connection. The reason for this error was that a
QUIC stream has no socket descriptor. However checking for eof is not the
right thing to do for an HTTP/3 QUIC stream since HTTP/3 clients are expected
to shut down the write end of the stream after sending the request.
Now the function handles QUIC streams separately. It checks if c->read->error
is set. The error flags for c->read and c->write are now set for all streams
when closing the QUIC connection instead of setting the pending_eof flag.
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According to quic-transport draft 29, section 19.3.1:
The value of the Gap field establishes the largest packet number
value for the subsequent ACK Range using the following formula:
largest = previous_smallest - gap - 2
Thus, given a largest packet number for the range, the smallest value
is determined by the formula:
smallest = largest - ack_range
While here, changed min/max to uint64_t for consistency.
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A QUIC stream could be destroyed by handler while in ngx_quic_stream_input().
To detect this, ngx_quic_find_stream() is used to check that it still exists.
Previously, a stream id was passed to this routine off the frame structure.
In case of stream cleanup, it is freed along with other frames belonging to
the stream on cleanup. Then, a cleanup handler reuses last frames to update
MAX_STREAMS and serve other purpose. Thus, ngx_quic_find_stream() is passed
a reused frame with zeroed out part pointed by stream_id. If a stream with
id 0x0 still exists, this leads to use-after-free.
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The limits on active bidi and uni client streams are maintained at their
initial values initial_max_streams_bidi and initial_max_streams_uni by sending
a MAX_STREAMS frame upon each client stream closure.
Also, the following is changed for data arriving to non-existing streams:
- if a stream was already closed, such data is ignored
- when creating a new stream, all streams of the same type with lower ids are
created too
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Also, ngx_quic_create_uni_stream() is replaced with
ngx_quic_open_stream() which is capable of creating a bidi stream.
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The ngx_http_perl_module module doesn't have a notion of including additional
search paths through --with-cc-opt, which results in compile error incomplete
type 'enum ssl_encryption_level_t' when building nginx without QUIC support.
The enum is visible from quic event headers and eventually pollutes ngx_core.h.
The fix is to limit including headers to compile units that are real consumers.
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Now c->listening->handler() is called instead.
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Also, introduced ngx_stream_quic_module.
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The parameter allows processing HTTP/0.9-2 over QUIC.
Also, introduced ngx_http_quic_module and moved QUIC settings there
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The right protocol is selected by the HTTP code. In the QUIC code only verify
that some protocol was selected and trigger an error otherwise.
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Previously, the main connection log was there. Now it's the stream connection
log.
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According to quic-transport draft 29, section 21.12.1.1:
Prior to validation, endpoints are limited in what they are able to
send. During the handshake, a server cannot send more than three
times the data it receives; clients that initiate new connections or
migrate to a new network path are limited.
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The ngx_quic_queue_frame() functions puts a frame into send queue and
schedules a push timer to actually send data.
The patch adds tracking for data amount in the queue and sends data
immediately if amount of data exceeds limit.
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Instead of timer-based retransmissions with constant packet lifetime,
this patch implements ack-based loss detection and probe timeout
for the cases, when no ack is received, according to the quic-recovery
draft 29.
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Instead of returning NGX_DONE/NGX_OK, the function now itself moves
passed frames range into sent queue and sets PTO timer if required.
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The c->quic->retransmit timer is now called "pto".
The ngx_quic_retransmit() function is renamed to "ngx_quic_detect_lost()".
This is a preparation for the following patches.
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To minimize difference with the following changes.
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According to the quic-recovery 29, Section 5: Estimating the Round-Trip Time.
Currently, integer arithmetics is used, which loses sub-millisecond accuracy.
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Previous behaviour was to pass everything to the client, but this
seems to be suboptimal and causes issues (ticket #1695). Fix is to
drop extra data instead, as it naturally happens in most clients.
This change covers generic buffered and unbuffered filters as used
in the scgi and uwsgi modules. Appropriate input filter init
handlers are provided by the scgi and uwsgi modules to set corresponding
lengths.
Note that for responses to HEAD requests there is an exception:
we do allow any response length. This is because responses to HEAD
requests might be actual full responses, and it is up to nginx
to remove the response body. If caching is enabled, only full
responses matching the Content-Length header will be cached
(see b779728b180c).
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The function finalizes QUIC connection with an application protocol error
code and sends a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame with type=0x1d.
Also, renamed NGX_QUIC_FT_CONNECTION_CLOSE2 to NGX_QUIC_FT_CONNECTION_CLOSE_APP.
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Using SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_VERIFY_PEER) implies that OpenSSL will
send a certificate request during an SSL handshake, leading to unexpected
certificate requests from browsers as long as there are any client
certificates installed. Given that ngx_ssl_trusted_certificate()
is called unconditionally by the ngx_http_ssl_module, this affected
all HTTPS servers. Broken by 699f6e55bbb4 (not released yet).
Fix is to set verify callback in the ngx_ssl_trusted_certificate() function
without changing the verify mode.
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See sections 5.2 and 5.8 for the current values.
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So that connections are protected from failing from on-path attacks.
Decryption failure of long packets used during handshake still leads
to connection close since it barely makes sense to handle them there.
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A previously used undefined error code is now replaced with the generic one.
Note that quic-transport prescribes keeping connection intact, discarding such
QUIC packets individually, in the sense that coalesced packets could be there.
This is selectively handled in the next change.
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That way it makes more sense. Previously it was closed with INTERNAL_ERROR.
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The patch removes remnants of the old state tracking mechanism, which did
not take into account assimetry of read/write states and was not very
useful.
The encryption state now is entirely tracked using SSL_quic_read/write_level().
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quic-transport draft 29:
section 7:
* authenticated negotiation of an application protocol (TLS uses
ALPN [RFC7301] for this purpose)
...
Endpoints MUST explicitly negotiate an application protocol. This
avoids situations where there is a disagreement about the protocol
that is in use.
section 8.1:
When using ALPN, endpoints MUST immediately close a connection (see
Section 10.3 of [QUIC-TRANSPORT]) with a no_application_protocol TLS
alert (QUIC error code 0x178; see Section 4.10) if an application
protocol is not negotiated.
Changes in ngx_quic_close_quic() function are required to avoid attempts
to generated and send packets without proper keys, what happens in case
of failed ALPN check.
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The ctx->pnum is incremented after the packet is sent, thus pointing to the
next packet number, which should not be used in comparison.
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quic-transport draft 29, section 14:
QUIC depends upon a minimum IP packet size of at least 1280 bytes.
This is the IPv6 minimum size [RFC8200] and is also supported by most
modern IPv4 networks. Assuming the minimum IP header size, this
results in a QUIC maximum packet size of 1232 bytes for IPv6 and 1252
bytes for IPv4.
Since the packet size can change during connection lifetime, the
ngx_quic_max_udp_payload() function is introduced that currently
returns minimal allowed size, depending on address family.
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