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<title>nginx.git/src, branch release-1.3.7</title>
<subtitle>nginx</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.sigsegv.uk/nginx.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>OCSP stapling: build fixes.</title>
<updated>2012-10-01T13:54:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Maxim Dounin</name>
<email>mdounin@mdounin.ru</email>
</author>
<published>2012-10-01T13:54:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.sigsegv.uk/nginx.git/commit/?id=7eea509776b9dfc35b4b0b45f0aceeb36420aacd'/>
<id>7eea509776b9dfc35b4b0b45f0aceeb36420aacd</id>
<content type='text'>
With the "ssl_stapling_verify" commit build with old OpenSSL libraries
was broken due to incorrect prototype of the ngx_ssl_stapling() function.
One incorrect use of ngx_log_debug() instead of ngx_log_debug2() slipped in
and broke win32 build.
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
With the "ssl_stapling_verify" commit build with old OpenSSL libraries
was broken due to incorrect prototype of the ngx_ssl_stapling() function.
One incorrect use of ngx_log_debug() instead of ngx_log_debug2() slipped in
and broke win32 build.
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>OCSP stapling: ssl_stapling_verify directive.</title>
<updated>2012-10-01T12:53:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Maxim Dounin</name>
<email>mdounin@mdounin.ru</email>
</author>
<published>2012-10-01T12:53:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.sigsegv.uk/nginx.git/commit/?id=bec2cc5286e5888eb1de9462f7c64b922967b47b'/>
<id>bec2cc5286e5888eb1de9462f7c64b922967b47b</id>
<content type='text'>
OCSP response verification is now switched off by default to simplify
configuration, and the ssl_stapling_verify allows to switch it on.

Note that for stapling OCSP response verification isn't something required
as it will be done by a client anyway.  But doing verification on a server
allows to mitigate some attack vectors, most notably stop an attacker from
presenting some specially crafted data to all site clients.
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
OCSP response verification is now switched off by default to simplify
configuration, and the ssl_stapling_verify allows to switch it on.

Note that for stapling OCSP response verification isn't something required
as it will be done by a client anyway.  But doing verification on a server
allows to mitigate some attack vectors, most notably stop an attacker from
presenting some specially crafted data to all site clients.
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>OCSP stapling: OCSP_basic_verify() OCSP_TRUSTOTHER flag now used.</title>
<updated>2012-10-01T12:51:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Maxim Dounin</name>
<email>mdounin@mdounin.ru</email>
</author>
<published>2012-10-01T12:51:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.sigsegv.uk/nginx.git/commit/?id=3ebbb7d521e9faeebdfdbba0a98a7a029e56c0a2'/>
<id>3ebbb7d521e9faeebdfdbba0a98a7a029e56c0a2</id>
<content type='text'>
This is expected to simplify configuration in a common case when OCSP
response is signed by a certificate already present in ssl_certificate
chain.  This case won't need any extra trusted certificates.
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
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<pre>
This is expected to simplify configuration in a common case when OCSP
response is signed by a certificate already present in ssl_certificate
chain.  This case won't need any extra trusted certificates.
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>OCSP stapling: log error data in ngx_ssl_error().</title>
<updated>2012-10-01T12:50:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Maxim Dounin</name>
<email>mdounin@mdounin.ru</email>
</author>
<published>2012-10-01T12:50:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.sigsegv.uk/nginx.git/commit/?id=1a07a7f2de10b59a0942706d3049e9da86e55a2a'/>
<id>1a07a7f2de10b59a0942706d3049e9da86e55a2a</id>
<content type='text'>
It's hard to debug OCSP_basic_verify() failures without the actual error
string it records in the error data field.
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
It's hard to debug OCSP_basic_verify() failures without the actual error
string it records in the error data field.
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>OCSP stapling: check Content-Type.</title>
<updated>2012-10-01T12:48:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Maxim Dounin</name>
<email>mdounin@mdounin.ru</email>
</author>
<published>2012-10-01T12:48:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.sigsegv.uk/nginx.git/commit/?id=872563a64d8d0952a3b9f058cd763440421427c7'/>
<id>872563a64d8d0952a3b9f058cd763440421427c7</id>
<content type='text'>
This will result in better error message in case of incorrect response
from OCSP responder:

... OCSP responder sent invalid "Content-Type" header: "text/plain"
    while requesting certificate status, responder: ...

vs.

... d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE() failed (SSL:
    error:0D07209B:asn1 encoding routines:ASN1_get_object:too long
    error:0D068066:asn1 encoding routines:ASN1_CHECK_TLEN:bad object header
    error:0D07803A:asn1 encoding routines:ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I:nested asn1 error)
    while requesting certificate status, responder: ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This will result in better error message in case of incorrect response
from OCSP responder:

... OCSP responder sent invalid "Content-Type" header: "text/plain"
    while requesting certificate status, responder: ...

vs.

... d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE() failed (SSL:
    error:0D07209B:asn1 encoding routines:ASN1_get_object:too long
    error:0D068066:asn1 encoding routines:ASN1_CHECK_TLEN:bad object header
    error:0D07803A:asn1 encoding routines:ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I:nested asn1 error)
    while requesting certificate status, responder: ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>OCSP stapling: loading OCSP responses.</title>
<updated>2012-10-01T12:47:55+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Maxim Dounin</name>
<email>mdounin@mdounin.ru</email>
</author>
<published>2012-10-01T12:47:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.sigsegv.uk/nginx.git/commit/?id=74ad4494a66d7ea5201c37f6628707404df723fe'/>
<id>74ad4494a66d7ea5201c37f6628707404df723fe</id>
<content type='text'>
This includes the ssl_stapling_responder directive (defaults to OCSP
responder set in certificate's AIA extension).

OCSP response for a given certificate is requested once we get at least
one connection with certificate_status extension in ClientHello, and
certificate status won't be sent in the connection in question.  This due
to limitations in the OpenSSL API (certificate status callback is blocking).

Note: SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file() was reimplemented as it doesn't
allow to access the certificate loaded via SSL_CTX.
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This includes the ssl_stapling_responder directive (defaults to OCSP
responder set in certificate's AIA extension).

OCSP response for a given certificate is requested once we get at least
one connection with certificate_status extension in ClientHello, and
certificate status won't be sent in the connection in question.  This due
to limitations in the OpenSSL API (certificate status callback is blocking).

Note: SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file() was reimplemented as it doesn't
allow to access the certificate loaded via SSL_CTX.
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>OCSP stapling: the ngx_event_openssl_stapling.c file.</title>
<updated>2012-10-01T12:42:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Maxim Dounin</name>
<email>mdounin@mdounin.ru</email>
</author>
<published>2012-10-01T12:42:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.sigsegv.uk/nginx.git/commit/?id=f7ec295fb4bd81d8840e51021d44270ccd9ab222'/>
<id>f7ec295fb4bd81d8840e51021d44270ccd9ab222</id>
<content type='text'>
Missed in previous commit.
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Missed in previous commit.
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>OCSP stapling: ssl_stapling_file support.</title>
<updated>2012-10-01T12:41:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Maxim Dounin</name>
<email>mdounin@mdounin.ru</email>
</author>
<published>2012-10-01T12:41:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.sigsegv.uk/nginx.git/commit/?id=85c920a0cd4983679fe51ad492abf5dea8ccc497'/>
<id>85c920a0cd4983679fe51ad492abf5dea8ccc497</id>
<content type='text'>
Very basic version without any OCSP responder query code, assuming valid
DER-encoded OCSP response is present in a ssl_stapling_file configured.

Such file might be produced with openssl like this:

openssl ocsp -issuer root.crt -cert domain.crt -respout domain.staple \
             -url http://ocsp.example.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Very basic version without any OCSP responder query code, assuming valid
DER-encoded OCSP response is present in a ssl_stapling_file configured.

Such file might be produced with openssl like this:

openssl ocsp -issuer root.crt -cert domain.crt -respout domain.staple \
             -url http://ocsp.example.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>OCSP stapling: ssl_trusted_certificate directive.</title>
<updated>2012-10-01T12:39:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Maxim Dounin</name>
<email>mdounin@mdounin.ru</email>
</author>
<published>2012-10-01T12:39:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.sigsegv.uk/nginx.git/commit/?id=3648ba7db833d318269daba2a8d6be42660c5b60'/>
<id>3648ba7db833d318269daba2a8d6be42660c5b60</id>
<content type='text'>
The directive allows to specify additional trusted Certificate Authority
certificates to be used during certificate verification.  In contrast to
ssl_client_certificate DNs of these cerificates aren't sent to a client
during handshake.

Trusted certificates are loaded regardless of the fact whether client
certificates verification is enabled as the same certificates will be
used for OCSP stapling, during construction of an OCSP request and for
verification of an OCSP response.

The same applies to a CRL (which is now always loaded).
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The directive allows to specify additional trusted Certificate Authority
certificates to be used during certificate verification.  In contrast to
ssl_client_certificate DNs of these cerificates aren't sent to a client
during handshake.

Trusted certificates are loaded regardless of the fact whether client
certificates verification is enabled as the same certificates will be
used for OCSP stapling, during construction of an OCSP request and for
verification of an OCSP response.

The same applies to a CRL (which is now always loaded).
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Resolver: cached addresses are returned with random rotation now.</title>
<updated>2012-09-28T18:28:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Maxim Dounin</name>
<email>mdounin@mdounin.ru</email>
</author>
<published>2012-09-28T18:28:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.sigsegv.uk/nginx.git/commit/?id=6a0f47e0797c8b797c806fab16ffc5bab40c0577'/>
<id>6a0f47e0797c8b797c806fab16ffc5bab40c0577</id>
<content type='text'>
This ensures balancing when working with dynamically resolved upstream
servers with multiple addresses.

Based on patch by Anton Jouline.
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This ensures balancing when working with dynamically resolved upstream
servers with multiple addresses.

Based on patch by Anton Jouline.
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
