Control characters (0x00-0x1f, 0x7f) and space are not expected to appear
in the Host header.  Requests with such characters in the Host header are
now unconditionally rejected.

In 71edd9192f24 logging of invalid headers which were rejected with the
NGX_HTTP_PARSE_INVALID_HEADER error was restricted to just the "client
sent invalid header line" message, without any attempts to log the header
itself.

This patch returns logging of the header up to the invalid character and
the character itself.  The r->header_end pointer is now properly set
in all cases to make logging possible.

The same logging is also introduced when parsing headers from upstream
servers.

Control characters (0x00-0x1f, 0x7f), space, and colon were never allowed in
header names.  The only somewhat valid use is header continuation which nginx
never supported and which is explicitly obsolete by RFC 7230.

Previously, such headers were considered invalid and were ignored by default
(as per ignore_invalid_headers directive).  With this change, such headers
are unconditionally rejected.

It is expected to make nginx more resilient to various attacks, in particular,
with ignore_invalid_headers switched off (which is inherently unsecure, though
nevertheless sometimes used in the wild).

Control characters (0x00-0x1f, 0x7f) were never allowed in URIs, and must
be percent-encoded by clients.  Further, these are not believed to appear
in practice.  On the other hand, passing such characters might make various
attacks possible or easier, despite the fact that currently allowed control
characters are not significant for HTTP request parsing.

From now on, requests with spaces in URIs are immediately rejected rather
than allowed.  Spaces were allowed in 31e9677b15a1 (0.8.41) to handle bad
clients.  It is believed that now this behaviour causes more harm than
good.

HTTP clients are not allowed to generate such requests since Transfer-Encoding
introduction in RFC 2068, and they are not expected to appear in practice
except in attempts to perform a request smuggling attack.  While handling of
such requests is strictly defined, the most secure approach seems to reject
them.

No valid CONNECT requests are expected to appear within nginx, since it
is not a forward proxy.  Further, request line parsing will reject
proper CONNECT requests anyway, since we don't allow authority-form of
request-target.  On the other hand, RFC 7230 specifies separate message
length rules for CONNECT which we don't support, so make sure to always
reject CONNECTs to avoid potential abuse.

Previously, TRACE requests were rejected before parsing Transfer-Encoding.
This is not important since keepalive is not enabled at this point anyway,
though rejecting such requests after properly parsing other headers is
less likely to cause issues in case of further code changes.

After 2096b21fcd10, a single RST_STREAM(NO_ERROR) may not result in an error.
This change removes several unnecessary ctx->type checks for such a case.

Previously, once received from upstream, it couldn't limit
opening additional streams in a cached keepalive connection.