In limit_req, auth_delay, and upstream code to check for broken
connections, tests for possible connection close by the client
did not work if the connection was already closed when relevant
event handler was set.  This happened because there were no additional
events in case of edge-triggered event methods, and read events
were disabled in case of level-triggered ones.

Fix is to explicitly post a read event if the c->read->ready flag
is set.

The response size check introduced in 39501ce97e29 did not take into
account possible padding on DATA frames, resulting in incorrect
"upstream sent response body larger than indicated content length" errors
if upstream server used padding in responses with known length.

Fix is to check the actual size of response buffers produced by the code,
similarly to how it is done in other protocols, instead of checking
the size of DATA frames.

Reported at:
http://mailman.nginx.org/pipermail/nginx-devel/2021-March/013907.html

Sun C complains about "statement not reached" if a "return" is followed
by additional statements.

The stub status module and ngx_http_send_response() (used by the empty gif
module and the "return" directive) incorrectly assumed that responding
to HEAD requests always results in r->header_only being set.  This is not
true, and results in incorrect behaviour, for example, in the following
configuration:

   location / {
       image_filter size;
       return 200 test;
   }

Fix is to remove this incorrect micro-optimization from both stub status
module and ngx_http_send_response().

Reported by Chris Newton.

After 7675:9afa45068b8f and 7678:bffcc5af1d72 (1.19.1), during non-buffered
simple proxying, responses with extra data might result in zero size buffers
being generated and "zero size buf" alerts in writer.  This bug is similar
to the one with FastCGI proxying fixed in 7689:da8d758aabeb.

In non-buffered mode, normally the filter function is not called if
u->length is already 0, since u->length is checked after each call of
the filter function.  There is a case when this can happen though: if
the response length is 0, and there are pre-read response body data left
after reading response headers.  As such, a check for u->length is needed
at the start of non-buffered filter functions, similar to the one
for p->length present in buffered filter functions.

Appropriate checks added to the existing non-buffered copy filters
in the upstream (used by scgi and uwsgi proxying) and proxy modules.

With introduction of open_file_cache in 1454:f497ed7682a7, opening a file
with ngx_open_cached_file() automatically adds a cleanup handler to close
the file.  As such, calling ngx_close_file() directly for non-regular files
is no longer needed and will result in duplicate close() call.

In 1454:f497ed7682a7 ngx_close_file() call for non-regular files was removed
in the static module, but wasn't in the flv module.  And the resulting
incorrect code was later copied to the mp4 module.  Fix is to remove the
ngx_close_file() call from both modules.

Reported by Chris Newton.

Similarly to the problem fixed in 2096b21fcd10 (ticket #1792),
when a "trailer only" gRPC response (that is, a response with the
END_STREAM flag in the HEADERS frame) was immediately followed by
RST_STREAM(NO_ERROR) in the data preread along with the response
header, RST_STREAM wasn't properly skipped and caused "upstream
rejected request with error 0" errors.
Observed with "unknown service" gRPC errors returned by grpc-go.

Fix is to set ctx->done if we are going to parse additional data,
so the RST_STREAM(NO_ERROR) is properly skipped.  Additionally, now
ngx_http_grpc_filter() will complain about frames sent for closed
stream if there are any.

Now "s", "V", and "v" format specifiers may be prefixed with "x" (lowercase)
or "X" (uppercase) to output corresponding data in hexadecimal format.

In collaboration with Maxim Dounin.

In some cases it might be needed to reject SSL handshake based on SNI
server name provided, for example, to make sure an invalid certificate
is not returned to clients trying to contact a name-based virtual server
without SSL configured.  Previously, a "ssl_ciphers aNULL;" was used for
this.  This workaround, however, is not compatible with TLSv1.3, in
particular, when using BoringSSL, where it is not possible to configure
TLSv1.3 ciphers at all.

With this change, the ssl_reject_handshake directive is introduced,
which instructs nginx to reject SSL handshakes with an "unrecognized_name"
alert in a particular server block.

For example, to reject handshake with names other than example.com,
one can use the following configuration:

    server {
        listen 443 ssl;
        ssl_reject_handshake on;
    }

    server {
        listen 443 ssl;
        server_name example.com;
        ssl_certificate example.com.crt;
        ssl_certificate_key example.com.key;
    }

The following configuration can be used to reject all SSL handshakes
without SNI server name provided:

    server {
        listen 443 ssl;
        ssl_reject_handshake on;
    }

    server {
        listen 443 ssl;
        server_name ~^;
        ssl_certificate example.crt;
        ssl_certificate_key example.key;
    }

Additionally, the ssl_reject_handshake directive makes configuring
certificates for the default server block optional.  If no certificates
are configured in the default server for a given listening socket,
certificates must be defined in all non-default server blocks with
the listening socket in question.