Per RFC 3986 only the following characters are allowed in URIs unescaped:

unreserved    = ALPHA / DIGIT / "-" / "." / "_" / "~"
gen-delims    = ":" / "/" / "?" / "#" / "[" / "]" / "@"
sub-delims    = "!" / "$" / "&" / "'" / "(" / ")"
              / "*" / "+" / "," / ";" / "="

And "%" can appear as a part of escaping itself.  The following
characters are not allowed and need to be escaped: %00-%1F, %7F-%FF,
" ", """, "<", ">", "\", "^", "`", "{", "|", "}".

Not escaping ">" is known to cause problems at least with MS Exchange (see
http://nginx.org/pipermail/nginx-ru/2010-January/031261.html) and in
Tomcat (ticket #2191).

The patch adds escaping of the following chars in all URI parts: """, "<",
">", "\", "^", "`", "{", "|", "}".  Note that comments are mostly preserved
to outline important characters being escaped.

After 4954530db2af, the ";" character is escaped by
ngx_escape_uri(NGX_ESCAPE_ARGS).

On Linux, SO_REUSEADDR allows completely duplicate UDP sockets, so using
SO_REUSEADDR when testing configuration results in packets being dropped
if there is an existing traffic on the sockets being tested (ticket #2187).
While dropped packets are expected with UDP, it is better to avoid this
when possible.

With this change, SO_REUSEADDR is no longer set on datagram sockets when
testing configuration.

Since nginx always uses exactly one entry in the question section of
a DNS query, and never uses compression pointers in this entry, parsing
of a DNS response in ngx_resolver_process_response() does not expect
compression pointers to appear in the question section of the DNS
response.  Indeed, compression pointers in the first name of a DNS response
hardly make sense, do not seem to be allowed by RFC 1035 (which says
"a pointer to a prior occurance of the same name", note "prior"), and
were never observed in practice.

Added an explicit check to ngx_resolver_process_response()'s parsing
of the question section to properly report an error if compression pointers
nevertheless appear in the question section.

Instead of checking on each label if we need to place a dot or not,
now it always adds a dot after a label, and reduces the resulting
length afterwards.

To make the code easier to read, reworked the ngx_resolver_copy()
copy loop to match the one used to calculate length.  No functional
changes.

Previously, anything with any of the two high bits set were interpreted
as compression pointers.  This is incorrect, as RFC 1035 clearly states
that "The 10 and 01 combinations are reserved for future use".  Further,
the 01 combination is actually allocated for EDNS extended label type
(see RFC 2671 and RFC 6891), not really used though.

Fix is to reject unrecognized label types rather than misinterpreting
them as compression pointers.

It is believed to be harmless, and in the worst case it uses some
uninitialized memory as a part of the compression pointer length,
eventually leading to the "name is out of DNS response" error.