Previously, the recursion was only limited for cached responses.
When several requests were waiting for a response, then after getting a CNAME response only the last request's context had the name updated. Contexts of other requests had the wrong name. This name was used by ngx_resolve_name_done() to find the node to remove the request context from. When the name was wrong, the request could not be properly cancelled, its context was freed but stayed linked to the node's waiting list. This happened e.g. when the first request was aborted or timed out before the resolving completed. When it completed, this triggered a use-after-free memory access by calling ctx->handler of already freed request context. The bug manifests itself by "could not cancel <name> resolving" alerts in error_log. When a request was responded with a CNAME, the request context kept the pointer to the original node's rn->u.cname. If the original node expired before the resolving timed out or completed with an error, this would trigger a use-after-free memory access via ctx->name in ctx->handler(). The fix is to keep ctx->name unmodified. The name from context is no longer used by ngx_resolve_name_done(). Instead, we now keep the pointer to resolver node to which this request is linked. Keeping the original name intact also improves logging.
No functional changes. This is needed by the following change.
When several requests were waiting for a response, then after getting a CNAME response only the last request was properly processed, while others were left waiting.
If one or more requests were waiting for a response, then after getting a CNAME response, the timeout event on the first request remained active, pointing to the wrong node with an empty rn->waiting list, and that could cause either null pointer dereference or use-after-free memory access if this timeout expired. If several requests were waiting for a response, and the first request terminated (e.g., due to client closing a connection), other requests were left without a timeout and could potentially wait indefinitely. This is fixed by introducing per-request independent timeouts. This change also reverts 954867a2f0a6 and 5004210e8c78.
OpenSSL doesn't check if the negotiated protocol has been announced. As a result, the client might force using SPDY even if it wasn't enabled in configuration.
The code failed to ensure that "s" is within the buffer passed for parsing when checking for "ms", and this resulted in unexpected errors when parsing non-null-terminated strings with trailing "m". The bug manifested itself when the expires directive was used with variables. Found by Roman Arutyunyan.